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ABSTRACT
Since the mid-1970s the British Labour Party has embarked 
upon a series of journeys up and down the nation's political 
spectrum. The central focus of this study is a survey of 
these changes in direction, and an explanation of why these 
movements occurred. The question posed is, what motivated the 
party to move further to the left of the spectrum than ever 
before, only to embark on a return trip which has given the 
party the most right-wing policy stances of its history?
To achieve this examination the paper uses the Downsian1 
theory of political parties as its starting point. Downs 
argues that in a two-party system parties will move only to 
the political center, because here electoral success is most 
likely. Labour's move to the left disproves this. The 
explanation for the move is found in an examination of the 
party's internal factions. They compete for control of the 
party's institutions and pull the party's position towards 
their own ideological stance. Although the party's return to 
the center in the late 1980s might have suggested a Downsian 
strategy, it is in fact explained by factional influence and 
Labour's response to a Conservative agenda. The result of 
reforms, instigated by party leader Neil Kinnock, was to move 
the party towards the center but it never set out with a 
Downsian objective.
The study is closely tied to Labour's electoral fortunes. 
It explains why the party appeared first to adopt positions 
which guaranteed defeat, but then went on to sacrifice long 
held principles in the search for electoral success.
The study reaches conclusions on two levels. Firstly, it 
presents the Dual Advisory Theory, which goes a long way in 
explaining the factional battles which shifted the party's 
position during the late 1970s and 1980s. It then brings the 
party's history up to date with its defeat in the 1992 general 
election and the selection of a new leader. By reviewing the 
evidence from the 1980s and the party's continued electoral 
failure, it ends by concluding that further radical reforms 
are vital. Without them the party may struggle to survive in 
its present form after the next general election.
1See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1957.
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WHICH WAY NOW?
An examination of the ideological movement of the 
British Labour Party between 1974 and 1992
CHAPTER I
THE MOTIVATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Having been heavily defeated in the general election of 
1979, the British Labour Party undertook a series of radical 
policy reforms which placed them on the left extreme of the 
nations political spectrum. The Socialists made a rapid move 
away from the consensus politics which had been dominant in 
post-war Britain.
In 1983, the Conservative Party secured a record-breaking 
election success.1 Labour's policy changes had been suicidal. 
The result led to conclusions that the party was out of touch 
with the predominant views of the British electorate. The
appearance was that Labour knowingly adopted a position which 
guaranteed electoral failure. A move away from the center was 
regarded as a precursor of electoral defeat. How can the 
party's shift in the early 1980s be explained? Do parties 
have more complex goals than simply the securing of office and 
the power and prestige which accompanies it?2 Other
1The Conservatives collected 42.9% of the popular vote 
and won 379 seats in the House of Commons. Labour, the second 
largest party secured only 27.6% and 209 seats. The result 
left the Tories with a 144 seat majority over all other
parties, a record in post-war Britain.
2 The best argument set out in favor of the view that
politicians act purely out of self interest when seeking 
election, wanting only the power and prestige of office, comes 
from David Mayhew in Congress; The Electoral Connection. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
2
3priorities may well exist, such as ideologically driven 
policies, or the desire of some for power within the party 
unit itself.
This chapter explores the motivation of political 
parties. To do this it considers the classic Downsian3 model 
of party competition which sees parties as purely electorally 
motivated. It then goes on to examine problems which exist 
with the Downsian model, and concludes by presenting an 
alternative approach to the study of party strategy.
The Downsian Theory of Party Competition.
In his classic work, An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
Anthony Downs constructs a model to explain the behavior of 
political parties. In relation to this study of party 
motivation, three central propositions can be drawn from 
Down's analysis: his development of the spatial model of party 
competition, his vote seeking hypothesis and his 
identification of parties as unified teams4.
1: Spatial Model of Party Competition.5
As early as 1929, Harold Hotelling constructed a 
spatial analysis of political parties, which was later
3 Anthony Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1957.
4 Downs, chapters 9 and 10.
5 This is also known as the median voter theorem, i.e. 
parties converge on the position of the median voter.
4developed by Arthur Smithies.6 It was Downs, though, who 
first popularized the model which centers on the construction 
of a single dimensional, left-right political spectrum. The 
greater the distance a location is from the center, the more 
extreme a left or right- wing position is. Downs argues that 
voters are able to locate parties upon the spectrum, and 
consequently support the party closest to their own position. 
Parties are said to be ideologically mobile along the 
spectrum, and able to adjust their viewpoints to reflect the 
vote maximizing position. As the overriding goal of parties 
is vote maximization, they are happy to sacrifice their 
ideologies to reflect the position where maximum support 
exists.
From this, assuming the electorate is normally 
distributed along the continuum, Downs concludes that in a 
two-party system party ideologies will converge. Parties will 
increasingly mirror each other in terms of ideological 
position, as they, "deliberately change their platforms so 
that they resemble one another."7 As party ideologies come 
together, "if the distribution of ideology in a society's 
citizenry remains constant,"8 the result will be each party's
6 See H.Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," The 
Economic Journal. Vol.39 (1929), pp.41-57 and A.Smithies, 
"Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," The Journal of 
Political Economy. Vol.49 (1941), pp.423-439.
7 Downs, p.115.
8 Ibid.
5arrival at the political equilibrium.
Assuming that voter distribution is concentrated at the 
center, with the greatest number at 50 on a 0-100 left-right 
scale, both parties will converge on this center. While 
parties may risk alienation of voters on their extreme, the 
move to the center is not halted. The number of votes to be 
lost on the extreme is only minimal when compared with those 
to be gained in the middle. This equilibrium may not be at 
the exact center of a left-right political spectrum, but a 
vote maximizing position will exist in any two-party system. 
How far left or right this position is depends on the 
"skewdness of the system."9 Only when voters' preferences 
are, "distributed so that voters are massed bimodally near the 
extremes,"10 will the parties remain poles apart in terms of 
ideology.
2: Vote Seeking Hypothesis.
As his conclusion to An Economic Theory of Democracy. 
Downs presents a series of "specific testable hypothesis."11 
His first such hypothesis is that, "party members have as 
their chief motivation the desire to obtain the intrinsic 
rewards of holding office; therefore they formulate policies 
as a means to holding office rather than seeking office in
9 See David Robertson, A Theory of Party Competition. 
London: John Wiley and Sons, 1976, p.29.
10 Downs, p. 118.
11 Ibid. , pp.296-300.
6order to carry out preconceived policies.1,12
Downs' posits that the primary motivation for seekers of 
elected office is personal power. Ideology and policy can be 
adapted, keeping the party at the political center. For 
Downs, policies are formed purely as an aid to election, not 
with the goal of policy implementation once in office. 
Similarly, an ideology is one of several electoral tools, 
formed as information economizing devices to appeal to voters. 
The result of such motivations is party pursuit of the 
political optimum. As policy and ideology are electorally 
driven, they are manipulated in order to win votes.
3: Parties United.
Downs perceives parties as single units. Leaders and 
members, in his theory, act as one in the pursuit of electoral 
success. Parties are treated as unified teams, working 
together in the pursuit of a single goal— electoral success. 
Downsian Theory and Post-War British Politics.
It is possible to relate the previously explained 
Downsian theory to events in post-war British politics. 
Taking the period from 1945 to the early 1970s, evidence is 
found of party behavior reflecting the Downsian model. During 
this period the two main parties appeared to take turns in 
redefining their ideological positions, ensuring that both 
remained in the best possible position for electoral success.
As the Labour Party swept to power in the general
12 Ibid. , p.296.
7election of 1945, it was their policy finger placed firmly on 
the political pulse of the nation. Commitments to the 
creation of the welfare state and the national health service, 
as well as to a level of full employment, put them at the 
center of the new political spectrum. The majority of a war 
weary nation now supported Labour's interventionist policies. 
By contrast, the pre-war Tory "laissez-faire" approach to 
government was out of touch. Collecting only 39% of the 
popular vote, down 13.9% on 1935, and 213 seats in the House 
of Commons, the Conservatives were devastated. Their appeal 
appeared to be increasingly limited to a minority on the 
right. Although 1945 was only one electoral defeat, the 
extent of the Conservatives demise since 1935 left many 
questioning the party's future. Was Britain about to enter a 
period of one-party rule?
Had the Tories continued their traditional approach to 
government, rejecting the new direction undertaken by the 
Socialists and remaining firmly on the right, the answer may 
well have been, yes. But the Conservatives adapted.13 A 
Downsian strategy was pursued, in which the Tories altered 
their ideological beliefs in the pursuit of electoral gains. 
Accepted were the welfare state, the national health service 
and most of nationalization; embraced were full employment and 
Keynesian economics. The result was a Tory return to power in
13 See Ivor Crewe and David Searing, "Ideological Change 
in the British Conservative Party." American Political Science 
Review. Vol. 82, II, 1988, pp.361-384.
81951, and a sequence of three consecutive election victories 
during that decade. The Conservatives had demonstrated their 
own discovery of the new political center in British politics.
For Labour the Tory discovery of the center, meant their 
thunder was stolen. As the Conservatives accepted a new level 
of intervention by the national government, the economic boom 
of the 1950s cast doubts over the Socialist's economic 
strategy. Their traditional approach, built around public 
ownership, was seen as outdated. Labour's response came 
through its most right-wing leader ever. Hugh Gaitskell led 
his party through its own series of internal reforms, ensuring 
Labour's policy reflected the capitalist direction west 
European economics were taking. The mixed economy became the 
core of Labour's economic strategy. While the Clause Four14 
commitment to public ownership of industry remained, specific 
nationalization proposals were limited to the 
renationalization of steel. By the time of the 1964 election, 
Labour had rejoined the Conservatives at the political center.
The era of ' Butskellism'15 had arrived, and little
14 The Labour Party constitution, in Clause Four, states 
that the party holds an overriding commitment to the public 
ownership of industry. In government the party should always 
act to carry out this principle, if the constitution is to be 
strictly adhered to.
15 'Butskellism' was named for the Conservative Chancellor 
Rab Butler and Hugh Gaitskell, due to the mirroring of their 
policies. This was also known as the "Westminster" model of 
government, so named by Samuel Beer.
9seemed to distinguish the two parties approach to the economy. 
With economic prosperity being the number one priority of all 
governments, both parties enjoyed the cozy Phillip's curve 
trade off between inflation and unemployment. Both employed 
the Keynesian strategy of tinkering with the economy at the 
macro level, producing short-term economic gains. The 
differences between the two were largely regarded as ones of 
personality. Comfortably straddling the perceived political 
center, both enjoyed an acceptable degree of electoral 
success.
A definite case can be made that this period of British 
politics neatly fits the Downsian model, as both parties 
reached for the center of the spectrum. If the three Downsian 
propositions introduced earlier are considered specifically in 
relation to post-war Britain, further support is found.
Is Spatial Model of Party Competition.
In the search for electoral success both parties 
appeared to move to the center. An optimum vote collecting 
position was perceived. Labour's policies and ideology 
reflected a moderate left position, while the Conservatives 
took the moderate right. As Downs theorized, the parties were 
often ambiguous over policy positions, only identifying 
themselves on the spectrum through minimal efforts to please 
their extremes. Downs explains, "this may in fact be the only 
way to tell the two parties apart ideologically, since most of 
their policies are conglomerated in an overlapping mass in the
10
middle of the scale."16 
2: Vote Seeking Hypothesis.
In relation to the premise that the goal of political 
parties is vote maximization, a mirroring of the Downsian 
theory is seen again. No political observer would deny that 
a principle goal of all major political parties, when 
operating under a democratic system, is to secure office. 
However, this period of British politics fits the Downsian 
model perfectly due to the ideological adaptation which 
occurred. After Labour's success in 1945, a majority in the 
Tory party found a new social conscience, while from 1948 
onwards Labour's ties with pure socialism and national 
economic ownership were increasingly severed. Ideological 
sacrifices were clearly being made by both parties to move 
them to the political center and ensure continued electoral 
dividends. Electoral success was a priority, as opposed to 
ideological purity.
3: Parties United
While in reality parties can never be as uniform as the 
Downsian model suggests, both the Conservatives and Labour 
kept internal disputes to a minimum during the 1950s and 
1960s. Divisions within the Tories were always kept inside 
the party hierarchy and not publicized. Labour did fight some 
public battles in the late 1950s, but these were more of
16 Downs, p. 135.
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personality than policy substance.17
Evidence supporting the Downsian model is unquestionably 
in existence during this period. The model appears to offer 
a simple explanation of the motivation and behavior of 
political parties in post-war Britain. Their desire was 
simply the control of parliament. To do this, they adapted 
their policies and ideologies to fit the current mood of the 
country. Conversely, the period since the early 1970s has 
demonstrated the behavior of political parties may be far from 
being so simple. Left unexplained by the Downsian model is 
the dancing up and down the political spectrum which has 
occurred in Britain since the mid-1970s. Mrs.Thatcher dragged 
the Conservatives further right than ever before, while the 
1Bennites118 took Labour even further towards the opposite 
extreme. It is with these ideological movements of the Labour 
Party that this study is concerned. Why did Labour so clearly 
break from the political center, so vital under the Downsian 
model, and assume a position of seeming electoral self- 
destruction? And how, when the party had just undertaken such 
a radical move, did Neil Kinnock manage to guide a return to 
the center?
The fact that Labour moved along the political spectrum
17 See Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould: The Birth and 
Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Oxford: Robertson, 
1981.
18 The 'Bennites' is a name given to a large number of 
left-wing Labour MPs during the 1970s and 1980s, with former 
cabinet minister Tony Benn as a figurehead leader.
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during the 1980s is evidenced by the fluctuation in its policy 
positions. To demonstrate this it is possible to review its 
changing manifesto commitments.19 Examined are selected 
manifesto pledges made by Labour between 1979 and 1992.20 
Chosen are three policy areas: nationalization, taxation and 
national health provision. Each of these can easily be 
located on a single dimensional, left-right spectrum. To 
judge the change in policy commitment, both the amount of 
manifesto coverage and extremity of actual pledges are 
considered.
1: Nationalization.
Throughout most of the world, government control of 
industry is a policy associated with parties on the left of 
the political spectrum. With the construction of the Labour 
Party constitution, Clause Four established the state 
ownership of industry as a primary economic principle. The 
level of party commitment to Clause Four has fluctuated during 
the post-war period, and significant variations in emphasis 
are seen between 1979 and 1992.
In 1979, the manifesto 'The Labour Way is Better for
19 See Robertson, chapter 4, "The Correlates of 
Ideological Change," pp 93-136, which explores party movement 
between 1924 and 1966. In his "A Theory of Party 
Competition," David Robertson uses the method of measuring 
manifesto pledges to measure changes in party positions.
20 For the manifestos of 1979, 1983 and 1987 I have used 
the versions in British General Election Manifestos 1959-1987. 
Dartmouth: Parliamentary Research Services, 1990, compiled and 
edited by F.W.S. Craig. For 1992 I used the Labour Party 
Publication It's time to get Britain working again.
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Britain, 1 spent only two short paragraphs of a 2 0 page
document21 considering the party policy on nationalization.
Contained within the section concerned with the creation of
"Jobs and Prosperity,' Labour promised merely to use "public
ownership to sustain and create new jobs."22 No commitment
to new nationalization was made. The emphasis given to
private investment was three times greater, a policy at odds
with a socialist strategy of government economic control. In
1983 'The New Hope for Britain1 presented a contrasting
policy. "Public and Co-operative Enterprise" is central to
the program for rebuilding industry. Labour was committed not
only to renationalize what the 1979-83 government privatized,
but also to establish a, "significant public stake in
electronics, pharmaceuticals, health equipment and building
materials."23 Detailed proposals were made to allow the
steel industry,
through planned investment, to meet the rising 
demand for economic expansion. We will retain the 
five major BSC [British Steel Corporation] plants 
and see that a larger share of the home market is 
met from UK production. A major public presence 
will also be established in the steel stock-holding 
industry.24
The manifesto also committed to public ownership of the 
British Aerospace Corporation, while pledging to, "re­
21 2 0 pages as reproduced by Craig.
22 Ibid. , p.288.
23 Ibid. , p. 460.
24 Ibid. , p.356.
14
establish the British Shipbuilding Corporation as a public 
sector company.1'25
1983 therefore represented a definite move to the left 
for Labour. Not only was the emphasis on nationalization far 
greater, but detailed policy commitments were made for 
renationalization and new public ownership projects. This 
indicates a return to the party's roots and the commitments of 
its constitution.
Although it remained, the commitment to social ownership 
in 1987 was far less emphasized. Placed under the broad 
banner of industrial policy, two paragraphs did make a 
commitment to "take a socially owned stake in high-tech 
industries and other concerns."26 While promising to return 
utilities such as gas and water to public ownership, gone were 
the precise details of government economic control.
"It's time to get Britain working again," published for 
the 1992 election, committed a Labour government to its most 
right-wing industrial strategy ever. Two lines only were 
given over to nationalization with the pledge, "We will 
restore public control of the National Grid."27 All plans 
for new areas of public ownership had been abandoned. 
Industrial policy was for the first time built around aid to
25 Ibid. , p.356.
26 Ibid. , p. 4 61.
27 The Labour Party, It's time to get Britain Working 
again. London: Labour Party, 1992, p.13.
15
the private sector. The manifesto explained, "modern 
government has a strategic role, not to replace the market but 
to ensure that the market works properly."28 Tax incentives 
were to be introduced to aid small businesses and encourage 
private investment.29 Labour had moved back across the 
political spectrum, further right than ever before. The stark 
contrast between the Labour of 1983 and Labour of 1992 is 
shown by last years pledge to "proceed with a leasing scheme 
of 188 new Network trains on the North Kent line— the first 
step in securing private investment to help modernize 
Britain's railways."30 Labour was proposing private control 
of state owned British Rail.
2: Taxation.
A redistributive taxation policy is synonymous with 
parties of the left. Income tax, in Britain, is the most 
progressive tax and so tends to be emphasized by a party 
looking for a greater level of income redistribution. In 1979 
Labour made no mention of income tax in its manifesto. The 
six lines on taxation stressed only curtailing evasion. While 
a plan did exist to introduce a wealth tax, little emphasis 
was given to tax policy and tax increases.
1983's manifesto was not specific about the actual levels 
of increase in income tax, but emphasis on the tax was
28 Ibid. , p. 11
29 Ibid. , pp. 12-13.
30 Ibid. , p. 10.
16
increased. The platform explained, "Some taxes will have to 
be increased, both to shift the tax balance towards those who 
can best afford to pay, and to help finance our social 
programs."31 Considering the extensive public expenditure 
programs Labour planned, even with its commitment to borrow 
funds, income tax levels would have had to be substantially 
increased.
A similar policy was presented in 1987, with a proposed 
Kinnock government preparing to reverse the two percent cut in 
the basic rate of income tax made earlier in the year. Labour 
promised, "the extra tax cuts which the richest 5 per cent 
have received from the Tory government,"32 would be reversed 
and the money redistributed to the "most needy." For 1992 a 
shift to the right can again be perceived as Labour attempted 
to allay fears it they would be a 'tax and spend1 government. 
For the first time a specific ceiling of 50% was set for 
income tax bands.
3: Health.
Many in the Labour movement regard the creation of the 
National Health Service by the Attlee administration, as one 
of the greatest achievements of that, or any, government. 
Free health care for all is a policy traditionally associated 
with the left. Conservative governments have accepted the 
NHS, but only when tempered with private insurance.
31 Craig, p.351.
32 Ibid. , p. 460 .
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Thatcherite policy increasingly looked towards the extension 
of private health care.
A priority was made of health in Labour*s 1979 manifesto, 
with six paragraphs setting out a detailed policy.33 Opposed 
were higher prescription charges, and a target was set for an 
end to all charges. Private health schemes were not attacked, 
although a "phasing out" of private beds in the NHS was to 
occur. In 1983 Labour's emphasis on health was further 
expanded. More radical policies were now presented, with an 
end to all health charges and the prevention of a further 
expansion of the private sector. The left-wing manifesto 
promised that a Labour government would, "take into the NHS 
those parts of the profit-making sector which can be put to 
good use."34 As with the other policy areas explored above, 
1983 sees Labour positioned firmly on the left of the policy 
spectrum.
By 1987 the emphasis on health had been cut. While 
Labour pledged to cut waiting lists and stop the 
"privatization" of the NHS, which the Thatcher government was 
accused of, the detailed radical proposals of 1983 were gone. 
Although the 1992 manifesto devoted a full two pages (out of 
27) to the health issue, the proposals made were not similar 
to those in 1983. Labour attacked the reforms of the Tory
33 Ibid. , p.291.
34 Ibid. , p.365.
18
government, promising to end 'opting-out.|35 Major new 
investments were planned but no attacks on private health care 
were made. Labour believed that health was a policy on which 
it could score vital political points. This was to be done 
through the exploitation of perceived Conservative weakness, 
not Labour's own radicalism.
The exploration of these three policy areas demonstrates 
the extent to which Labour's movement along the political 
spectrum during the past 13 years has occurred. In no way has 
Labour carried out a continual search for the center ground of 
British politics. While the Kinnock modernization strategy 
may have taken what appeared a Downsian path, producing the 
party's most right wing policy pledges ever, leaders prior to 
this did not. Downs, at best, appears not to be a truth for 
all times.
For Downs, no logic exists for a party not to adopt a 
vote maximizing position at all times. When opinions in the 
electorate are stable, with the majority at the center, no 
possible motive exists for diversity. Assuming that the 
majority were massed around the center following the period of 
party centerism explored earlier, attitudes since then have
35 "Opting out" was a policy developed by the Thatcher 
government where hospitals could chose to remove themselves 
from the control of the local health authority and become more 
financially independent. The opposition attacked this as a 
step towards privatizing national health hospitals.
19
been largely stable.36 For example, in 1974 29.5% of the 
electorate felt the trade unions had too much power, in 1987 
29.1% did. Over the same period support for welfare increases 
rose from 23% to 34%, while the proportion of the electorate 
believing in a greater redistribution of income fell from 56% 
to 48%.37 Since 1974 the only statistically significant 
shift in attitudes has been in favor of greater privatization. 
In all other cases attitudes have remained stable.
Downs would ask why the Labour party would rationally 
undertake any ideological movement. The answer is that in 
reality party decisions are far more complex than suggested by 
his model.
1: Spatial Model of Party Competition.
The Downsian model is a single dimensional presentation. 
Under this model all policies can be represented on a single 
line. Downs' contention is that voters and parties can locate 
all policies in terms of a left-right division. In reality, 
this may not be the case.38 Can attitudes toward the 
European Community be packaged neatly on the left-right 
spectrum? The answer is no. Supporters of European 
integration exist both within the Conservative and Labour
36 See Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Geoff 
Evans Julia Fields and Sharon Witherspoon, Understanding 
Political Change. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991, chapter 11.
37 Figures from Ivor Crewe and Neil Day, The British 
Electorate 1963-1987. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991, chapters 7,8 and 9.
38 Robertson, chapter 5.
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parties, and are proportionately most numerous amongst the 
"center" Liberal Democrats. European union is not a left- 
right issue.
To further demonstrate the existence of policies which 
cannot be placed on the left-right split we can consider the 
work of Crewe and Searing.39 They have constructed a model 
which demonstrates that at least two dimensions operated in 
British politics during the 1980s. Upon the traditional left- 
right political spectrum are found economic policies. 
However, a second spectrum is also found to be influential in 
vote determination— the Authoritarian spectrum. Here the 
range is from a liberal to authoritarian approach to social 
policies such as crime and the death penalty. Some voters who 
traditionally associate with the left simultaneously related 
to the authoritarian Thatcherite approach. While convergence 
of support is possible under a two dimensional model, it is 
mathematically impossible for parties to appeal to a majority 
if multiple dimensions (i.e. more than two) are in 
existence.40 As a result, under a multi-dimensional model 
many of the propositions made by Downs* are invalidated. A 
simple political center for parties to move to no longer 
exists.
While accepting this criticism of the Downsian model, it
39 Crewe and Searing, pp.361-384.
40 See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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is equally important to recognize that the left-right spectrum 
dominates modern politics and elections. The mass media has 
a controlling influence on the way politics operates, as they 
offer the main source of political information. As the media 
chooses to condense the vast majority of issues on to the 
left-right spectrum, the electorate tends to operate in a 
similar manner. Our exploration of the changes in Labour's 
policy position over the past 13 years demonstrates this. 
Most major issues can be located on the left-right scale. 
Parties and politicians are well aware of the significance of 
such locations, and while they may attempt to make cross­
dimensional appeals, as over the EC, they still perceive a 
left-right spectrum along which they are mobile.
If we accept that modern politics is dominated by the 
left-right spectrum, Labour's movement away from the center is 
still unexplained. Downs' second and third propositions become 
central.
2: Vote Seeking Hypothesis.
While not denying that parties desire electoral victory, 
Budge and Farlie add "The key questions are how far they are 
prepared to alter and adopt their other goals in order to win, 
and whether they seek to win under all circumstances."41
a) Ideology: Policies and ideologies are, in reality, far
41 See Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, Voting and Party 
Competition-A Theoretical Critigue and Synthesis Applied to 
Surveys from Ten Democracies. London: John Wiley and Sons, 
1976, p.114.
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more than electoral tools. As Richard Rose demonstrates in 
his study of how election programs in Britain relate to future 
spending in government, party programs do define priorities. 
His study concludes, "British parties can be assumed to carry 
through most of their election priorities into government and 
to impose them, at least in a broad sense, upon the state 
apparatus."42 Party programs are more than electoral tools.
Further to this, the Crewe and Searing study of the 
Conservative Party under Mrs.Thatcher43 demonstrates that 
personal ideology on a political extreme need not be 
sacrificed for electoral success. Although Downs' sees 
ideology as only a means to gaining office, little support for 
the Thatcherite brand of conservatism existed within her own 
party during the early 1970s, and even less was found in the 
country. Thatcherism was never designed to move the party 
closer to the electorate as a whole. Using survey data from 
the 1972-3 period, Crewe and Searing found that only 17% of 
the electorate endorsed the core Thatcher ideology of strong 
government and free enterprise. When authority was added, (eg 
in terms of a strong stance against crime), only 3% shared the 
opinions of the Thatcherite band. No evidence of Downsian 
motives can be found. Thatcher and her chief ally, Sir Keith 
Joseph, "self-consciously moved away from the electoral
42 See Richard Rose, Do Parties make a difference? London: 
MacMillan, 1984.
43 Crewe and Searing, p.382.
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center...Joseph’s central theme was the importance of getting 
it right rather than getting elected."44
What Mrs.Thatcher wanted to do was shape public opinion 
to her way of thinking, rather than adapting her own ideology 
to fit that of the general populous. Although survey data 
demonstrates that Mrs. Thatcher failed in this goal,45 she 
enjoyed substantial electoral success while being located more 
to the extreme of the political spectrum. Her victories show 
that voters determine the direction of their ballots on more 
than ideological position. Competence and perceived success 
in government can be vital electoral determinants, regardless 
of where parties stand on the left-right spectrum.
Accepting this, it is possible to conclude that rational 
politicians may maintain ideological positions which are not 
aligned with the political center. An ideological commitment 
may not destroy electoral prospects. The Labour move to the 
left in the early 1980s can be seen as no more irrational than 
Mrs.Thatcher1s move to the right. She went on to govern for 
over ten years. Had Labour been victorious in 1983, and gone 
on to govern successfully, their extreme position on the left- 
right spectrum would have survived far longer.
b) Party supporters: A strategy designed purely for the 
approval of voters may fail to attract needed party
44 Ibid. , p. 374.
45 See Heath et al. chapter 11.
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resources.46 Whether in terms of financial support or 
campaigners to get out the vote, a party must appeal to those 
willing to sacrifice a higher cost than simply the effort of 
voting. As David Robertson explains, "A policy that has the 
approval of a majority of electors may be useless if it cannot 
attract enough active supporters to get that potential vote 
out."47 Those willing to make such sacrifices tend to be on 
the ideological extremes, and so pull the party away from what 
may be its most competitive position.
3: Parties Disunited.
Downs excludes the possibility of factionalism amongst 
party leaders, but leadership of modern political parties 
never emanates as a single voice. Within one party several 
competing groups, with their own aims and interests, can 
exist. During the 1970s and 1980s such factions within the 
Labour Party became institutionalized, and widely reported in 
the press. Labour was anything but a single unified team. 
Competition between party elites continued through the 1983 
general election, with sectional goals often thwarting those 
of the party as a whole. In the struggle for power within the 
party competing elites, "pulled in two [or more] directions at 
once, away from and towards the competitively best 
position."48 This struggle for power therefore becomes
46 Robertson, p. 32.
47 Ibid. , p.32.
48 Ibid. , p. 33.
25
central to party behavior, as it is these factions which may 
ultimately determine the external direction of a party.
An Alternative Theory of Party Motivation—
The Dual Advisory Theory.
While all major political parties do have as their 
primary goal electoral success, to understand the motivation 
of parties it needs to be appreciated that they can have other 
goals too. The work of Przeworski and Sprague49 has 
established that different ideological directions exist within 
a single party structure. These create divisions and internal 
competition for power. Factions arise and fight for control 
of the party's institutions. While parties may try to fight 
as a unified team in external battles, internally they can be 
severely divided. An alternative theory of party motivation 
must accept that British parties operate on dual levels—  
external and internal adversaries.
External Adversaries.
Downs, along with most political observers, is concerned 
with how political parties operate in relation to each other, 
as opposed to their internal operations. This is the external 
level of party operations and is centered around electoral 
competition. Both major parties in Britain can, and do, 
compete as versions of the unified teams pictured by Downs. 
They are not however unified at all times.
49 See Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones-An 
Electoral History of Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1986, chapter 5.
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Party unity is provoked only through self-interest. It is 
in the interest of activists to have their party in power. 
Until their party controls the levers of power, they have no 
hope of exercising influence over the direction of national 
policy. Even if an individual's faction is not dominant 
within the party, electoral success is still in his interest. 
Only when the party is in office will an extension of 
influence result in an impact on the nation. Periods of party 
unity are therefore likely to occur during the extended period 
of the long-campaign50 prior to a general election. At this 
time it is clear to all in the party structure that the 
opportunity of power, either defending or securing it, is at 
stake. For parliamentary members an added incentive is that 
their own seats, and therefore for some their jobs, are on the 
line. The likelihood of great vocal dissension from the 
leadership's position is substantially reduced. At other 
times the party in government has a greater tendency to mute 
internal division in the defense of its own administration. 
Party members are aware that their record in government will 
be judged at the following election. A tendency exists not to 
'rock the boat.'
50 William Miller et al in How Voters Change. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990, establish that during a general 
election campaign a short and a long campaign take place. The 
long campaign can take place for up to 18 months prior to a 
ballot as the parties compete to be in the best position for 
the short campaign. The short campaign may be as little as 
three weeks once the prime-minister has set the date for the 
general election.
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Internal Adversaries
Between them, the Labour and Conservative parties cover 
the great part of the British political spectrum. Due to 
their 'catch-all'51 nature, they are forced to encompass 
diverse groups amongst their representatives and activists. 
Groups from the far left are teamed with those who are simply 
left of center, and the same is true for the right of the 
spectrum. Complete ideological and policy unity is
impossible. Internal party factions, built around differing 
beliefs, cannot be avoided.
Control of a party's internal institutions tends to be 
shared by a coalition of factions. A single faction is almost 
never strong enough to hold every office within a party's 
structure. The level of influence a faction holds however, 
and the emphasis given to their policies, will vary. Because 
of this, internal factions compete for the greatest possible 
control over the party's external direction. Control of the 
party apparatus will shift from one faction to another after 
a period of continued external party failure. The severity of 
the failure will determine the extent of the pressure 
competing factions can exert in support of a change in party 
direction. Failure while in government, such as economic 
policy failure, can put pressure on, and create resentment
51 Catch-all was a name given to parties by Otto 
Kirchheimer in his study, "The Transformation of the west 
European party systems." From, J.Palambaro and M.Weiner 
(eds), Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1966.
28
towards, the current dominant faction. A change in factional 
control is unlikely during office, however, because unity is 
greater during this time and the leadership is in a stronger 
position to hold off challenges. This is because the 
additional power accruing to the prime-minister and cabinet 
produces dominance. The prestige that party leader has as 
head of government has a tendency to induce "deference amongst 
the rank-and-file."52 The cabinet's influence over the 
development of government policy, party unity in defense of 
governing record, and the government offices distributed at 
the leader's discretion, combine to produce loyalty in the 
party as a whole.
Electoral defeat is far more likely to produce a change 
in internal influence. After an external defeat an internal 
party post-mortem will be held. Scape-goats will be found. 
Lesser factions are now in a position to elevate themselves to 
a primary position. The severity of the defeat will determine 
the extent to which the party changes direction. If the party 
has been defeated on consecutive occasions, but the second
time improved its showing, a second change and reverse in
\
direction may not occur.
Complete changes in direction are rare due to the fact 
that a coalition is likely to dominate. Changes in emphasis 
are far more likely. Dramatic changes will occur only "(1)
52 Patricia Lee Sykes, Loosing from the Inside. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, p.17.
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after a devastating electoral defeat, [or] (2) when a 
victorious opponent*s ideology is thought to be popular.”53 
Labour and the Dual Advisory Theory.
An examination of the Labour Party in the post-war period 
supports this Dual Advisory Theory. Before looking 
specifically at the party*s activities, it is necessary to 
consider the constitutional structure of the party, as this 
encourages the growth of competing factions.
Constitutional Structure.
The Labour Party operates with a federal structure. 
Three power bases exist within the party— the Parliamentary 
leadership, the National Executive Committee (NEC), and the 
Party Conference. Dominance in one area guarantees a faction 
at least a voice in party affairs; very often control of one 
base gives a faction a guiding role in policy-making.
As with the American Constitution, what the Labour Party 
Constitution does not say is more important than what it 
does.54 Although the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) tends 
to dominate external relations, and is the area a faction must 
dominate if it is to control external relations, the 
Constitution does not define who has ultimate supremacy over 
policy formation. Each of the three power bases can be used 
to launch policy initiatives. Even without control of the
53 Crewe and Searing, p.378.
54 See Mclean, in Cook and Taylor (eds) The Labour Party. 
London: Longman, 1980, p.35.
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parliamentary leadership, a faction may use an alternative 
base to establish its own policy position and launch a 
challenge to the leadership. A leadership change, producing 
a new leader with a fresh policy direction, is often the final 
event of an internal faction shift.
1: Parliamentary Leadership
Although only one of three internal power bases, the 
parliamentary leadership is in a position to dominate the 
direction of policy when in government. Out of office, the 
parliamentary leadership faces far greater challenges. Policy 
resolutions from both Conference and the NEC can be forced 
upon it. When this is carried out by opposing factions, the 
leadership historically finds resistance difficult.
The foundation of parliamentary independence from other 
party institutions was established in the conference 
establishing the modern party. After the party had begun life 
as the Labour Representation Committee, it entered into 
negotiations with the Independent Labour Party in 1900. The 
leaders of the Representation Committee, Kier Hardie and 
Ramsay MacDonald won agreement "for a distinct Labour Group in 
Parliament, who shall have their own whip, and agree upon 
their policy."55 The Parliamentary Labour Party was not to 
take instructions from the mass membership. No Labour
leader has ever taken the view that MPs are responsible to the 
mass membership for policy decisions. However, leaders have
55 Ibid. , p.34.
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varied in their acknowledgement of a definitive role for other 
party institutions. Both Attlee and Gaitskell showed respect 
for the role of the conference. Attlee went as far as to 
state, "The Labour Party Conference lays down the policy of 
the Party, and issues instructions which must be carried out 
by the Executive, the affiliated organizations and its 
representatives in Parliament and local authorities."56 
Gaitskell demonstrated his acceptance of the conference role 
in his reaction to the 1960 vote for unilateralism. Rather 
than ignoring the decision he determined to campaign for its 
reversal at the following conference. Both Wilson and 
Callaghan suffered major defeats of their policy positions at 
the hands of conference. Neither paid much attention. Their 
power in the government allowed them to continue their own 
policy approaches.
2: National Executive Committee and Conference.
As the Constitution is silent on the issue, there is 
nothing that conference or the NEC can do to enforce their 
points of view. They can, however, be important platforms for 
internal voices of dissent. Not only do both structures 
provide for this, but the constitution provides them a role in 
the construction of the party manifesto.
Resolutions passed at Conference by a two-thirds majority 
become part of the 'Party Program.' This does not create an
56 C.R. Attlee The Labour Party in Perspective. Gollanez: 
London, 1937, p.293.
32
automatic commitment to translate the pledge into public 
policy, but it is a formal party position. The electoral 
manifesto is constructed by a joint committee of the cabinet, 
or shadow cabinet, and the NEC.
Without any constitutionally dominant body, competition 
between rival factions is encouraged. Although one faction 
may dominate the parliamentary leadership, opposing factions 
can work for influence through the alternative power bases. 
Internal conflict over the direction of policy is almost 
unavoidable. Reviewing the behavior of the Labour Party in 
the post-war years we find such competition.
For the general election of 1945, and the following 
government, a moderate/left coalition dominated the party 
structure. Internal dissent was minimal as the party was at 
its most popular position ever. The Attlee administration 
carried out the most radical social reforms ever seen in 
Britain.
After a narrow victory in 1950, Labour was removed from 
office in 1951. Since 1948 the party leadership had pulled 
away from a full socialist commitment, such as further 
nationalization, but it remained by far the most successful 
Labour leadership ever. Although externally defeated, the 
party's governing faction was largely unchallenged. The right 
of the party, muted during the previous government, did, 
however see a new direction for Labour. Following a further 
external defeat in 1955, and this time a more substantial one,
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the party entered its revisionist phase.
The change of party leader signalled a change in 
dominating faction. The right of the party was now to exert 
its greatest influence ever. Hugh Gaitskell led the party 
through a revision of economic policy which continued to the 
Wilson government.
With the economic failure of Wilson's 1964-70 
administration, pressure on the leadership grew. External 
defeat followed in the general election of 1970, and the 
factions of the left increased their influence at the 
conference and executive level. Electoral success saved the 
moderate/right coalition at the parliamentary level in 1974, 
but as the following chapters demonstrate, in the long-term 
this only led to greater internal hostility.
The Dual Advisory Theory demonstrates that parties do 
indeed move along the left-right ideological spectrum, but not 
necessarily in the fashion imagined by Downs. A change in 
factional dominance, which is often caused by electoral 
failure, creates a change in the overall policy of the party. 
As external conflicts continue the party will undertake a new 
position, which could be to the left or right of its previous 
stance. Factions compete continually on the basis of
ideology for influence within the party structure, and only 
when direct electoral competition is present do the parties 
tightly unify.
Since 1974 fluctuation of factional control has continued
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inside the Labour Party. Under the Downsian theory, stability 
of attitudes in the electorate during this time would result 
in the pursuit of the center ground. This has not occurred. 
Internal factional competition guaranteed that the party was 
pulled far to the left, before reforms beginning in the mid- 
1980s brought it back to the very center. The remainder of 
this study concentrates on the Labour party's ideological 
movements since 1974, demonstrating how internal factions have 
played a key role in the party's direction.
CHAPTER II
THE SEEDS OP DIVISION
Having suffered its worst electoral defeat in the post­
war period in the general election of 1979, Labour entered 
into a period of public dispute and division. The turmoil 
within the party structure was overwhelmingly clear for all to 
see. The left blamed the moderate leadership for abandoning 
socialist principles, while the right attacked the left for 
being too extreme. The internal factional dispute over 
direction was to dominate British party politics for the next 
ten years.57 While the division only became publicly clear 
after the May 1979 ballot, the roots go far beyond this 
electoral post-mortem. This chapter explores the origins of 
hostility within the party structure, dating back to the first
57Factions within the Labour party can be divided into 
five broad categories. The group found on the left extreme of 
the party is the "hard left." This group is referred to as 
democratic socialist. It believes in the state ownership and 
control of industry and the complete redistribution of wealth 
and income. Much of their ideology is shared with the former 
communist and socialist states of eastern Europe. The 
difference comes in this groups commitment to democracy. To 
their right on the party spectrum come first the "soft left," 
then the "center" and then the "soft right." Each of these 
three groups believes, to a differing degree, in some state 
ownership and control of industry along with some 
redistribution of wealth. On the right of the party is found 
the social democratic group. It tends to give far more 
support to free market economics, seeing the government role 
as correcting market deficiencies.
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Wilson government of 1964-1970, and the growth of the left 
which followed. The new internal strength of the left was 
then confirmed in the 1970-74 period, while Labour was out of 
office. The chapter demonstrates that intra-party disputes 
and the growth of the left had already created a party primed 
for a change in factional control, and a resulting new 
direction in external policy, prior to the 1974 elections. It 
concludes that the moderate leadership1s exit was postponed 
only by the party*s return to power in 1974.
While governments concern themselves with a wide spectrum 
of policy areas, it is economic policy which tends to be 
central to a party's policy platform. Whether it be national 
indicators, such as the level of unemployment and the rate of 
inflation, or personal concerns, such as the rate of 
individual taxation or level of income, the electorate demands 
that the economy be central to any election campaign. 
Correspondingly, when divisive factions exist within one of 
the two main British political parties, they invariably 
revolve around the direction of economic policy. As one 
policy appears to fail, pressure for a new direction 
increases.
The division of Labour from the late 1960s proved no 
exception to this. As the moderate leadership's economic 
policies were increasingly judged a failure, opposing factions 
established themselves around alternative economic approaches. 
While other issues, such as membership of the EEC and the
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question of inter-party democracy, grew to be significant, 
economic direction was always central to factional divisions.
For simplicity, the factions can be divided into two 
broad groups— those on the hard left who believed in a truly 
socialist economic strategy of national ownership and economic 
control, and those in the center and on the right who believed 
in the pursuit of a mixed economy. To understand how these 
opposing groups emerged it is necessary to undertake an 
examination of Labourfs post-war economic history.
Labour's Economic History.
Although the Labour Party came into office in 1945 with 
a commitment to nationalization, once the initial 
nationalization program was complete little else was proposed 
to influence the internal operation of industry. Labour 
placed its emphasis on full employment, to be achieved through 
Keynesian demand management. This reflected the commitment 
Labour had made after the publication of the 1942 Beveridge 
Report and the 1944 White Paper on employment.58 The party 
set as its primary economic aim the maintenance of a high and 
stable level of employment. The Keynesian solution used to 
solve unemployment required no detailed intervention in the 
economy at the micro level, but primarily the manipulation of 
fiscal policy from the center.
58 Both these war time documents set the maintenance of 
a 'high and stable level of employment' in post-war Britain as 
the primary economic objective. The Labour party fully 
endorsed the proposals.
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With the Conservative dominance of government during the 
1950s, many in the opposition party looked for revision of 
their traditional socialist economic approach. The result was 
the greatest period ever of social democratic strength within 
the Labour Party.59 Between 1955 and 1963 Hugh Gaitskell, 
with the support of right-wing trade union leaders and 
revisionist intellectuals such as Anthony Crosland,60 
reformed party policy to reflect modern west European 
economics. Although the Clause Four commitment to
nationalization remained, Labour professed support for the 
mixed economy.
'Britain Belongs to You,' the party's 1959 manifesto, 
explained that while steel would be renationlized Labour had 
"no other plans for further nationalization."61 Although 
Gaitskell failed at the party conference later that year to 
have the Clause Four commitment to state ownership removed 
from the Constitution, the manifesto gave a clear indication 
of the direction party policy had now taken. Labour set out 
a plan for the development of private industry, including a 
"tax policy... directed towards helping industry to mechanize, 
modernize and expand and make a maximum contribution to
59 See Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould-The Birth and 
Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Oxford: Robertson, 
1981, p.45.
60 Ibid. , p.45.
61 See F.Craig British General Election Manifestos 1959- 
1987. Dartmouth: Parliamentary research Services, 1990, p.15.
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Following a further election defeat in 1959, pressure 
from the revisionists increased. If Labour were again to be 
electorally viable the new direction in policy set by 
Gaitskell must continue. Under Harold Wilson this proved to 
be the case.
The Wilson Years 1963-1974.
The natural desire of a prime-minister and cabinet is to 
govern the country. The opportunity is open to them to 
implement their own policies and beliefs, righting the nations 
wrongs. In office a leader expects the full support of his 
party as he concentrates his efforts on governing.
While this may be the desire, the reality is that a 
leader must be constantly aware of activist demands. This is 
especially true for Labour leaders, due to the alternative 
power bases available within their party structure. A prime- 
minister may be in a position to resist demands due to his 
power, but in doing so he risks the build up of internal 
hostility. A truly successful leader will strike a balance 
between government and party, preventing the development of 
factional division. This is done through a willingness to 
consider factional demands, accepting a party role in policy­
making even when in office. Wilson never approached the 
delicate balance needed for a Labour prime-minister if party 
activists are to be kept happy. In Downing Street he
62 Ibid., p. 16.
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increasingly ignored the demands of both the center and the 
left. As the 1964-70 government floundered, the left took the 
opportunity to make advances within the party structure. While 
control of the parliamentary leadership was the last area of 
influence to fall to the left, it was the failures of leaders 
to acknowledge diverse factions which stimulated the latter's 
initial advance.
At the time of Gaitskell's death in 1963 the direction of 
the party remained to the right. Harold Wilson's traditional 
affiliation had been with the moderate left of the party, but 
his election as leader was a personal triumph, as opposed to 
a left-wing one. His success in no way represented a 
resurgence of left-wing influence over the party's direction. 
As leader he confirmed this, adopting a pragmatic approach to 
government, giving verbal offerings to the left but always 
acting in "the Gaitskellite tradition."63
Labour's general election victory in 1964 offered new 
hope, not only to the party but also to the direction of 
British economics. Their 1964 manifesto, 'Let's Go with 
Labour for the New Britain,' proposed a corporatist direction 
for the British economy. A national economic plan was to be 
formulated, "with both sides of industry operating in 
partnership with the government."64 The plan was to change
63 See Geoff Hodgson, Labour at the Crossroads. London: 
Robertson, 1984, p.71.
64 Craig, p.43.
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the structure of the British economy through a 'massive 
effort1 to modernize it. Advanced technology and science- 
based industries would provide a new backbone of British 
economic strength. A Ministry of Economic Affairs would be 
created to ensure a rapid increase in industrial investment. 
The tax system would be used to encourage greater private 
investment, while better terms of credit would also be made 
available.65
The promise of a new direction for British economics, 
breaking out of the stop-go cycle, created great optimism. 
This was especially true within the socialist movement. A new 
level of economic growth and equality appeared to be on offer, 
and was fully supported by the trade unions.
Once in office the 1964-66 government offered little real 
direction. Aware that a second general election was likely, 
the leadership looked only to consolidate the parties 
position. None of the promised radical strategies were 
pursued. Although 1965 did see the establishment of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs this was, "A pale shadow of semi­
corporatism national planning on the Continent; it consisted 
of little more than a compendium of expected growth rates for 
different industries, obtained, on the whole, by simply asking 
the managers and directors within industry what their growth 
targets were."66 The government even failed to operate a
65 Ibid. , p. 47.
66 Hodgson, p.77.
42
macroeconomic strategy with any real success, since the 
refusal to devalue necessitated deflationary policies. With 
no real strategy in existence the government drifted on to the 
1966 election. Not only had an economic opportunity been 
lost, but more significantly for the Labour leadership so had 
been the great optimism. By the time of the ballot Labour had 
reverted to the post-war British economic approach of 
deflation. The run on the pound in 1966 was treated in the 
same manner as by any previous Tory administration. Spending 
was cut and taxes were increased.
In the two years following Labour's reelection, economic 
events dictated the direction of the government. Currency 
speculation and balance of payments deficits were met with 
deflationary policies. The Labour government appeared to 
many, not only on the left of the party but also to more 
moderate trade union leaders, as a mirror image of a 
Conservative government. Where were the radical economic 
reforms promised in 1964? Where were the benefits for 
Labour's core support group— the working class?
Confidence in the leadership was drained. Trade union 
militancy increased and the annual number of working days lost 
to industrial disputes increased from an average of 2 to 3 
million in the years 1964-1967, to 4.7 million in 1968, 6.8 
million in 1969 and an average of 13.9 million between 1970 
and 1973.67 Their growing militancy, which in 1972 resulted
67 Figures from Hodgson, p.76.
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in the most days lost to strike action since the General 
Strike year of 1926, "forced the TUC [Trade Union Congress] 
into a more militant posture and played their part in the 
leftward movement of the Labour Party."68
With the Wilson leadership seemingly committed to a 
policy of deflation, which meant increased unemployment and a 
decreased standard of living, trade unionists began to shift 
their support. For many, "The abandonment of the National 
Plan and the trauma of the pay freeze showed without doubt 
that the government was not willing or able to deliver major 
reforms in the interests of the working-class."69 By 1968 
the leadership of two of the countries largest unions, 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union (AEU), had passed into the hands of the 
left. In 1969 the publication of the government White Paper, 
'In Place of Strife', proposing restrictions on trade union 
activities, caused a breakdown of relations between the 
leadership and the bulk of the party. Both the NEC and the 
trade unions openly opposed the document. Fifty-three Labour 
MPs voted against the bill on its first reading in the House 
of Commons and the government was forced in to withdrawal. 
Despite conceding, the damage to the leadership's position, 
and its isolation from the bulk of the party, increased.
The general election of 1970 returned the Conservatives
68 Ibid. , p.83.
69 Ibid. , p.76.
44
to power. Labour's moderate right faction had failed in
office and had led the party through external defeat. Such 
circumstances, under the Dual Advisory Theory, suggest an
imminent change in factional control within the party.
Subsequently a new direction for the party in external
relations would arrive. Although the right kept control of 
the parliamentary leadership through to 1980, this is what 
ultimately occurred.
Through the alternative power bases within the party 
structure, the left secured growing influence over policy 
direction. Wilson may have remained leader during the four 
years out of office, but policy direction was increasingly out 
of his hands. This is demonstrated by consideration of the 
following three areas of party division— the 1973 policy 
document 'Labour's Programme for Britain,' the debate over the 
EEC and the defeat of the leadership in Conference votes,
i) "Labour's Programme for Britain."
As chairman of the NEC's Home Policy Committee, Tony Benn 
succeeded in including radical nationalization policies70 in 
the 1973 policy document. Plans were made for the 
nationalization of 25 major British companies. While the 
right still controlled the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), 
outside parliament, "In an environment of industrial militancy 
and opposition to the Heath government, left-wing ideas were
70 See Patricia Lee Sykes Loosing from the Inside. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988, p.30.
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gaining support."71 The 1973 document accused the leadership 
of failing the party*s post-war economic pledge. Lost was the 
commitment to a true democratic socialist economic approach. 
Labour had done little more than touch the edges through its 
macro level Keynesian approach. The left, and a growing 
majority in the party as a whole, increasingly supported 
wholesale economic intervention. Chapter 2 of the plan, *A 
New Economic Strategy', promised to, "bring about a 
fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and 
wealth, in favour of working people and their families."72 
Criticism was launched at the power of a few multi-national 
companies, with such a small group holding such major sway on 
the British economy. The interests of profit motivated firms 
and the national interest were not seen as compatible. To end 
this dominance of the economy, direct control was planned. 
This would be achieved through the creation of a new state 
holding company, and invoking of compulsory planning 
agreements. This process would involve, "both the government 
and workers on the shop floor in the development and 
restructuring of industry."73
The successful passage of this program, through both the 
NEC and conference during 1973, gives a clear indication of
71 Hodgson, p.83.
72 Labour party, 'Labour's Programme for Britain.' Labour 
Party: London, 1973, p.7.
73 Hodgson, p.85.
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the rising influence the left held over the policy direction 
of the party. Without the benefits of government, the 
leadership could do little to resist. In accepting the 1973 
policy program as official party policy, Labour made its 
greatest single move to the left of the post-war period. Many 
were ready to abandon the social democratic approach, while 
so-called social democrats felt increasing unease with the 
direction their party was undertaking.
The deep divisions between the two wings of the party 
were becoming increasingly clear. These can be seen through 
an examination of the battle for EEC membership,
ii) EEC Membership.
The issue of membership of the European Community does 
not fall neatly on the left-right spectrum. However, from the 
early 1970s it was those on the right of the party who were 
most vocal in support of membership. Greatest hostility was 
found on the left, from those wanting to see Britain pursue an 
independent socialist path. The issue proved to be so 
divisive that speculation of a right-wing breakaway was 
already in existence. Although the suggestion was premature, 
at least suggestions of a breakaway of any significance, the 
divisions within the party structure were deep and hostile. 
Any immediate break was prevented by the fact that moderate 
control at the leadership level still remained. Deputy-leader 
Roy Jenkins may have felt alienation from his own party, but 
support from fellow members for a new party was not great.
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The party still remained electorally viable, with battles 
still to be fought from the inside.
As prime minister, Harold Wilson had applied for 
membership of the Community in 1967, and the party's 1970 
manifesto had supported entry. However, it opposed were the 
terms of entry accepted by the Heath government during 1972. 
The party leadership voted against the government on the 
parliamentary vote for entry, but a substantial minority of 
Labour MPs, most notably deputy leader Jenkins, remained 
completely committed to membership. In the final Commons vote 
on membership, 69 Labour MPs defied a 3-line whip to ensure 
the Conservative success.
Although Wilson had opposed the terms of entry accepted 
by the Conservatives, he was still largely in favor of the 
principle of membership. He promised to 'renegotiate' the 
terms when Labour returned to office. In addition a 
referendum would be held, a promise made to placate the 
hostile left.
This was exactly what happened after the second 1974 
election. Wilson and Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, set 
out to negotiate with their new European partners to reduce 
the penal level of British budgetary contributions. A 
compromise formula was constructed, aimed at substantially 
reducing the British financial input to the Community by the
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end of the decade.74 Wilson wholly endorsed membership, with 
the bulk of the cabinet coming out to campaign for a 'yes' 
vote in the promised referendum.
The battle between left and right in the party became 
clearly pronounced during the campaign. The pro-Marketeers 
found themselves campaigning with those who had previously 
been their political opponents, as Labour and Conservative 
moderates found more in common with each other than with the 
extremes of their own parties. While the right comfortably 
won this battle, the leadership was further isolated from many 
in its own party. Factional divisions over policy were clear 
for all to see.
iii) Conference Votes.
The growing power of the Left within the party was 
demonstrated by a series of Conference resolutions opposing 
the leadership's position. While conference holds no 
constituted position to force the leadership to carry out 
resolutions, the defeats suffered by the Wilson leadership 
indicated a changing tide within the party structure. When 
internal opposition becomes so great, the leadership 
ultimately must respond or be removed.
The first direct challenges to the leadership came while
74 In reality, the deal proved little better than that 
negotiated by Heath due to the size of the Common Agricultural 
Policy budget, which determined the level of revenues a nation 
received from the Community. Britain's smaller and more 
efficient agricultural sector qualified for less support than 
its European counterparts.
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Wilson was still prime minister. At the 1968 Blackpool 
Conference a resolution was passed by 4 million votes 
demanding the repeal of the governments incomes policy.75 
The rebellion against a fundamental government policy was lead 
by the TGWU leader, Frank Cousins. While senior ministers 
increasingly asserted "the doctrine that Labour Conference 
propose but the Labour Government will dispose,"76 it became 
increasingly difficult to act in this way. When the party's 
paymasters rejected a central government policy, the 
leadership was under threat.
This pattern continued following Labour's defeat in the 
1970 election. That year's conference passed a resolution 
attempting "to subjugate the party leadership and the 
Parliamentary Labour Party to the will of the conference."77 
Wilson called for the withdrawal of the motion, but the two 
biggest unions combined with the constituency parties to 
ensure its success.
Conference continued to pass resolutions and the 
leadership continued to resist. Following the passage of the 
1973 policy document, Wilson did attempt to placate 
conference. In his keynote speech he set out a long list of 
industries that he was happy to take out of private control, 
including all ports, ship building and aircraft. Wilson
75 See The Times. October 1st., 1968, p.l.
76 Ibid.
77 See The Times. October 1st., 197 0, p.l.
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appeared to offer his support to the nationalization pledges 
made in the policy document. In reality he was continuing his 
own policy of giving conference verbal reassurances, but 
acting as he saw fit. A year after returning to office in 
1974 the 197 3 document was forgotten.
Wilson's policy of attempting to placate conference and 
the left could only work for a limited period. Within the 
party structure the balance of power had now clearly changed. 
The moderate right had been forced into retreat. It was now 
surrounded in its final bastion of strength— the party 
leadership. Due to the growing numbers supporting the left it 
would be impossible for the moderate right to hold out for 
long.
Activist Change.
Once the party was out of office it became clear that the 
grass-roots had become far more radical than the leadership. 
Support for left-wing proposals, most significantly the 1973 
policy program, was substantial. The cause of this support is 
explained by two factors. First, the failure of the
previous government to offer any increase in the standard of 
living during its tenure obviously led to hostility. The 
administration was seen to have failed its core supporters. 
A natural tendency was to look for new direction.
Second, a shift had occurred in the composition of party 
membership from the early 1960s. Middle-class intellectuals 
and educated student activists became dominant, rather than
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the traditional working-class. Using their oratory and 
educational skills, the new activists were able to voic^ a 
radical, often Marxist, brand of socialism at all levels of 
the party.
At the elite level this is demonstrated by the change in 
the social origins of parliamentary members. In 1945 39% of 
new Labour MPs came from working-class backgrounds. In October 
1974 the proportion was 4.6%.78 Further to this, Dennis 
Kavanagh has surveyed the change in occupational backgrounds 
of Labour’s Westminster candidates.79 He classified 27% of 
Labour candidates as 'talkers' in 1951. (By 'talkers' he is 
referring to professions requiring oratory skills, such as 
lecturers, teachers, journalists and political activists, as 
opposed to traditional Labour candidates who tended to be 
manual workers.) In 1979 43% were 'talkers.'
A growth in middle-class candidates had taken place? 
candidates far more likely to espouse socialist, as opposed to 
social democratic, principles. A similar shift was seen in 
trade unions. Not only was there an expansion of white collar 
unions, but it was also the case that a growing number of 
union office holders were university graduates, as opposed to 
members who had worked their way up through the rank-and-
78 Figures from Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould. Oxford: 
Robertson, 1981, p.49.
79 See Dennis Kavanagh, "Representation in the Labour 
Party," Chapter 9 of Dennis Kavanagh (ed.), The Politics of 
the Labour Party. London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1982.
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file.80
The greatest level of change was found at the 
constituency level. It was here that young graduates were 
able to have a direct effect on the party, often taking 
control of working-class areas. Radicalized by the 
educational system, they, "belonged to the generation of 
student protest, of demonstrations against Vietnam and in 
favour of easier abortion, and of teach-ins on Marxism and 
revolutionary theory."81 Their view of the Labour movement 
was far removed from the traditionally moderate working-class 
trade unionists, previously dominant in the party structure. 
The radical socialists saw little in the 1964-70 government to 
soften their views. Wilson and the government were seen to 
have abandoned socialist principles. Through the conference 
and their influence over MPs, they aimed to return them. 
Destroyed was, "the fraternal, loyalist atmosphere in which 
the Labour Party had normally conducted its internal 
affairs.1,82
The strength of the left in the alternative power bases 
within the party structure meant that by 1974 a shift in 
emphasis at the leadership and external level was due. Defeat 
in the general election of February that year would have 
produced this. The surprise Labour victory, and confirmation
80 Bradley, p. 49.
81 Ibid. , p. 50.
82 Ibid. , p. 51.
of this in October, gave the moderate leadership a stay of 
execution. A return to the levers of power allowed it to 
renew its resistance. A successful government might have 
allowed a successful fight back, but the governments failure 
only served to increase hostility.
CHAPTER III 
THE CHANGING OF THE GUARD 
By October 1974 Labour had won four of the five previous 
general elections in the UK. In popular terms it was the 
country's strongest party, but internally was riddled by 
division. At the time the 1974 electoral success was 
celebrated, but, in the long-term, it provided for a bloodier 
public battle when power was lost.
This chapter explores the 1974-79 government and sees how 
the leadership was able to hold off the growing challenge of 
the left. Throughout the period left and right battled for 
control, with the dispute only finally settled after the 1979 
election. It was then the party undertook a policy position 
on the left-wing extreme. The chapter concludes that the 
party's move to the left can in fact only be explained by 
factional divisions within the party and the Dual Advisory 
Theory, not by any Downsian theory of party competition.
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the origins of 
party division were to be found in differences over economic 
policy. By the 1970s the British economy was in peril. 
Labour's surprise electoral success meant it was the party 
which had to attempt to find a solution to the long-term
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economic decline. The party was in no way unanimous as to the 
approach to be taken.
To understand fully the crisis facing the party, it is 
first necessary to explore the UK's post-war economic history 
of government mismanagement.
British Economic History.
From a position of global economic dominance at the end 
of the 19th century, the British economy had entered a period 
of long-term decline since the early decades of the 20th 
century. During the immediate post-war years, over two 
decades of continuous growth were enjoyed initially, but at 
the expense of long-term industrial investment. Economic 
policy was dominated by an obsession with the maintenance of 
a high rate of sterling.83 Whether a Labour or Conservative 
government, this conviction remained. Why?
Even in the post-war years, sterling remained a leading 
international currency. A high and stable level was seen to 
be necessary for the maintenance of confidence, both 
internationally and in the City of London. Many international 
reserves were still held in the British currency, not only by 
oil rich states but by states of the old Empire. The British 
government felt a responsibility to maintain a high exchange 
rate for the sake of these investments. The government was 
aware that any sign of weakness could result in the loss of
83 Peter Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution. London:Pan 
Books, 1987. See part 1, " The Old Order Crumbles."
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international confidence and the withdrawal of these reserves. 
If a major run on the pound began, the belief was it would be 
impossible to stop. A mass exodus of deposits would occur, 
creating a collapse in the currency level. The effect of such 
a collapse would go far beyond international prestige. The 
'openness* of the UK economy left it vulnerable to the import 
of inflation. A substantial fall in the value of sterling 
would result in higher priced imports. Domestic inflation 
would increase and manufacturing industry, relying on imported 
raw materials, would lose international competitiveness. It 
was feared that such a situation would create a spiral effect, 
in which British economic failure would lead to a further fall 
in the exchange rate, and a repeat of the sequence.
Emphasis on the level of sterling was clearly important, 
but with the advantage of hindsight, it was too great. 
Sterling was kept at an artificially high rate until the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s.84 The 
cost of giving the currency level priority over the real 
economy was two-fold— resource exhaustion and export failure,
i) Resource Exhaustion— Throughout the post-war period 
government resources were always centered on the defence of 
sterling, rather than on the problems of the structural 
domestic economy. Government policy centered on the knowledge 
that a substantial or continual balance of payments deficit
84 Britain was in fact a co-founder of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1944, with the United States, providing a further 
reason why governments were reluctant to devalue.
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was likely to create a run on the pound. As a result, in the 
post war period the British economy was subject to a series of 
deflations and reflations in the pattern of stop-go 
economics.85 With the operation of stop-go economics, which 
proved to be a short-term economic success and a route to 
political success until the late 1960s, Britain failed to 
develop an industrial strategy comparable to its major 
international competitors. While the UK did enjoy economic 
growth, the rate did not compare to its European competitors. 
Abroad, for example in France, industrial strategies were 
employed by central governments to encourage the development 
of industry. The French set up investment banks to provide 
long-term, low rate loans to industry. By contrast, in 
Britain, until the end of the 1960s, only a very limited 
amount was spent by governments to assist and strengthen the 
private sector. Although by the 1970s the UK was spending the 
same proportion of GDP on industrial grants as France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, it was not employing their 
strategy. As the Europeans concentrated on developing sectors 
which would be strong international competitors, powering the 
whole of their domestic economies, British governments 
emphasized regional aid to especially depressed areas.
85 'Stop-Go' was the phrase coined to describe the pattern 
of economics in the UK during the 1950s and 1960s. To achieve 
the required balance between the balance of trade and the 
exchange rate governments went through a series of deflation 
and reflations. These were achieved through Keynesian demand 
management techniques, but provided for only short-term 
successes.
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Westminster governments found themselves in the ridiculous 
situation of reflating certain areas through targeted aid, 
while simultaneously deflating the national economy as a 
whole. Any aid to specific industries which UK governments 
gave was to unprofitable firms, such as Rolls Royce and 
British Leyland, in bail out attempts. These were not firms 
which could fuel long-term economic growth.
Compounding the concentration on the exchange rate, the 
stop-go strategy and weak industrial policy, the UK failed, 
due to the independence of British industry. Both political 
parties lacked the will to intervene and force 
rationalization. The Conservatives had their own political 
interests tied to industry and the City, both of which opposed 
large scale intervention. Labourfs long standing ideology was 
nationalization, not the reviving of private industry. In 
addition to this, trade unions opposed wholesale intervention, 
fearing a threat to their autonomy in the work place,
ii) Export Failure— The overvaluation of the pound left 
British exports, in price terms, at a competitive 
disadvantage. The high level of exchange meant that the 
export sector of the economy was not encouraged, while imports 
were relatively cheap and therefore more appealing to the 
consumer. This, in turn, directly impacted on domestic 
producers trying to compete for the UK market.
British economic history is very much that of the 
politics of today rather than the economy of tomorrow. During
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the 1950s and 1960s governments were able to survive by 
reflating the economy to coincide with elections, providing 
short-term economic booms. Once this threatened the exchange 
rate the stop cycle was introduced and the economy was 
deflated. The cozy trade off between unemployment and 
inflation which accompanied this allowed governments to 
achieve what, at the time, was a happy medium. This was 
destroyed in the 197 0s when inflation and unemployment hit 
simultaneously and the Wilson-Callaghan government was left to 
face the problems of the long-term mismanagement of the 
British economy. The international recession exposed what 
clearly had been the long-term failure of UK policy. In 
coming to terms with this the Labour Party was in no way 
unanimous on the direction to be taken.
The Labour Government 1974-1979.
As the second Wilson administration took office, the 
left-wing dominated policy document, 'Labour's Programme for 
Britain,' remained official party policy. In government the 
leadership was in a position to resist such a policy 
direction, and by the October 1974 election it had been 
largely forgotten. Within two years it had been completely 
abandoned.86 This alone would have guaranteed the leadership 
further alienation from the left. Decisions made within the 
constituted party structure were being disregarded. Worse
86 See Paul Whiteley The Labour Party in Crisis. London: 
Metheun, 1983, p.129.
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still was what the left saw as the betrayal of the party's 
primary economic principle— the commitment to full employment.
The explanation for the economic direction undertaken by 
the leadership was the collapse of the Keynesian strategy 
universally employed by governments in the post-war period. 
The 1974-79 administration was the first to face the 
phenomenon of hyperinflation, when rising unemployment and 
inflation occur simultaneously. Inflationary pressures had 
been stored up in the economy prior to Labour's accession. 
During the second half of its term the Heath government of 
1970-1974 implemented a 'dash for growth' strategy. After the 
government had attempted to squeeze inflation out of the 
economy with cuts in spending during its first two years in 
office, a complete U-turn was employed. Money was pumped into 
the economy at a rapid rate in an attempt to increase 
employment, only to store up inflation for the ensuing Wilson 
administration. Furthermore, 1973 had witnessed the over 
night four-fold oil price increase. The economic response of 
most countries was to deflate their economies to control 
inflation. In Britain this did not occur.
Labour's Monetarist Conundrum.
During the 1930s the modern theory of monetarism was 
established, after the Fischer equation proved a link between 
the level of inflation and the level of the money supply.87
87 Irving Fisher was professor at Yale University when he 
made his proposition directly tying the rate of money supply 
to the rate of inflation.
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At the time governments had little regard for monetary policy, 
and with the dominance of fiscal policy in the post-war era it 
had commanded little attention. The early 1950s saw Milton 
Friedman and the Chicago School take up the monetarist cause, 
using empirical evidence to prove the link between inflation 
and the money supply.88 Examples, such as the increase in 
government spending between the two world wars, were sighted. 
For monetarists, inflation was the primary economic target at 
all times. Inflation is said to cause unemployment because it 
leaves firms uncompetitive.
With the globally high rates of inflation in the early 
1970s, monetarist solutions were increasingly sought. During 
the period of post-war prosperity the western world had never 
known simultaneously high levels of inflation and 
unemployment. How would the new Labour government react to 
this changing economic situation?89 Only a year previously 
their radical economic program had promised a new socialist 
assault on the British economy. The moderate leadership 
faction, although now in a minority in the party, did 
something very different.
Had the Conservatives been successful in the February of 
1974, they planned to introduce massive deflation to control
88 Milton Friedman, Studies in the Quantity Theory of 
Money. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
89 John Maclnnes, Thatcherism at Work. Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1987. Chapter 3, "The 1970s: The system in 
trouble.1
62
the upwardly spiralling prices. Labour's 1974 manifesto, 'Let 
Us Work Together,' did not deviate from its traditional policy 
goal of full employment. Labour would impose no incomes 
policy and would work with the unions on a basis of free 
collective bargaining. When Labour was elected many believed 
it was the party best equipped to deal with inflation, due to 
its trade union ties.
By February of that year, inflation already stood at 13%, 
while the money supply was increasing at 25% per annum.90 
Under a monetarist philosophy spending would be contracted. 
None in the Labour movement contemplated such a response. For 
the first six months in office the central economic policy was 
the Social Contract. This aimed to use free collective 
bargaining to reach limited wage settlements with the unions, 
and so control inflation. The idea behind the policy was that 
Labour and the trade unions both realized the need for wage 
restraint, and consequently agreements could be successfully 
negotiated. At this time the government did not plan to 
enforce any wage increase levels. Labour's October manifesto, 
'Britain Will Win with Labour,' did set inflation reduction as 
the "first and overriding priority."91 The means for doing 
this remained the Social Contract, although this approach was 
not to last.
90 Figures from Peter Browning The Treasury and Economic 
Policv-1964-1985. New York; Longman, 1986, p.264.
91 Labour party.Britain will win with Labour. London: 
Labour party, 1974, p.6.
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The rate of inflation continued to rise, along with 
public spending and the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. 
During Labour's first year in office public spending increased 
from 4 0.4% of GDP to 45.5%, while the PSBR grew from 6.5% of 
GDP to 11%.92 While monetarists called for cuts in spending 
to reduce the money supply, pressure within the Labour Party 
was for more spending rather than less. The parliamentary 
leadership of Wilson and Chancellor Healey held the only real 
concern inside the party with the level of inflation. Amongst 
the left little regard existed for the rate of inflation—  
employment was its continued objective. By the beginning of 
1975 inflation was over 20%, yet January had seen a White 
Paper proposing increased spending.
It was in the Budget of April 1975 that the first 
definite shift in policy, away from the traditional socialist 
approach, was seen. Public expenditure cuts off £901 million 
were announced. Tony Benn and Eric Heffer led the left's 
condemnation of the new direction of policy, and were joined 
by the NEC.
Healey's main target in the inflation battle still 
remained wage control, but the voluntary element of the Social 
Contract had clearly failed, as wage demands soared to 30, 40 
and even 50%. To control the racing inflation a compulsory 
incomes policy was proposed. A flat rate increase of six
92 Figures from Gary Peden, British Economic and Social 
Policy. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1986, pp.213-222.
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pounds a week maximum was agreed.
By June 1975, when the new pay policy was introduced, the 
foreign exchange markets were increasingly unstable. They 
failed to be convinced by the new policy, believing the 
government lacked any real commitment in the fight with 
inflation. On June 3 0th alone the pound fell 5 cents. 
Through the end of the year the government's sterling headache 
intensified, as the level against the dollar reached a record 
low, only increasing the likelihood of further inflation.
Since the Budget of 1975, when the Chancellor set the 
defeat of inflation as his primary target, public spending 
cuts had been on the agenda. Healey realized the only way 
inflation could be tackled in the short-term was by further 
cuts. While the incomes policy was still pursued it was 
little more than a political smoke screen.93 The policy was 
only a postponement of the inevitable monetarist medicine to 
come. Incomes policies had an amazingly poor record in 
Britain and it was unlikely one would survive to a second or 
third stage. Politically the Chancellor's policy was designed 
to keep as many groups as possible happy during 1975. By 
gradually introducing spending cuts the Chancellor could 
temporarily placate both his party and the City.
1976
The events of 1976 had a major impact on the future of
93 See Martin Holmes, The Labour Government of 1974-1979. 
London: MacMillan, 1984, pp.22-40.
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the Labour Party, because it was the culmination of economic 
failings in this year which resulted in the government's turn 
to the IMF for assistance. Conservative politicians have ever 
since ravaged Healey and the whole Labour movement for this 
decision. Whenever Labour's economic competence is discussed 
the image of Dennis Healey and his IMF begging bowl is 
resurrected. Although the economy did make a definite 
recovery by the end of 1978, the leadership of the party had 
been further wounded almost beyond salvation. The spending 
cuts of 1975 were followed in February 1976 with a further 
proposal from Healey to reduce public spending by one billion 
pounds in 1977/78 and by a further £2.4 billion in 1978/79.94 
The cuts were defeated in parliament due to rebellious left- 
wing Labour MPs. The cuts were only passed when the 
dissenters were forced into voting for the government on a 
vote of confidence.
Even with the February spending cuts, international 
confidence in the British economy remained low. Spending was 
still seen as too high, especially in relation to inflation. 
The markets remained nervous about investing in sterling, with 
the possibility of large scale withdrawals of foreign funds 
always present. During March the pound fell below $2 for the 
first time. The response of the financial markets was panic, 
as the Bank of England broke the golden rule of central banks 
by selling on a falling market. By May the pound stood at
94 Ibid., pp.29-33.
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$1.70, even when substantial government funds had been used to 
support it. It was this rapid fall which triggered events 
leading to the IMF call later in the year.
The Budget of 1976 only left the markets more unsettled, 
as Healey disappointed them by failing to offer further 
spending cuts. In July the Chancellor took up the option of 
borrowing $5.3 billion from international governments to 
support the pound. The loan, set up by the US Treasury, was 
a trap.95 In looking to avoid the IMF the government had in 
fact gone a step closer. The loan had to be repaid within six 
months. This proved impossible as the pound's decline 
continued through the fall, with $400 million of foreign 
currency reserves being used to support the pound in the first 
week of September alone. The instruction was given to stop 
supporting the pound, due to the fear that the whole foreign 
currency loan would be used up by the time of repayment. The 
government had been trapped by the loan, just as the US 
Treasury had hoped when organizing it.
On the 10th of September the Minimum Lending Rate was 
raised to 13% in an attempt to increase the demand for 
sterling. This gave the government little more than a brief 
respite. The pound continued to fall, and only substantial 
expenditure cuts would now satisfy the markets. The 
confirmation that this was indeed the path the leadership 
intended to take came later that month at the annual party
95 Browning, p. 259.
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conference. In his key note speech, Prime Minister Callaghan 
explained to a hostile audience,
We used to think you could spend your way out of a 
recession by cutting taxes and boosting government's 
spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no 
longer exists, it only worked on each occasion since the 
war by injecting a large dose of inflation into the 
economy followed by a high level of unemployment. Higher 
inflation followed by higher unemployment.96
Those on the left saw this as an absolute betrayal of the
long established commitment to full employment. Socialist
principles had seemingly been abandoned as monetarist theory
was employed. While the leadership was far from embracing the
principles of monetarism, recognizing only that at that time
the high inflation dictated a different approach, the
criticism from the left was savage.
The day following the Callaghan speech an application was
posted to the IMF for funds to support the pound and the
British balance of payments deficit. With the pound below
$1.50 and the MLR up to 15% the government appeared to have
little choice but to consume the IMF medicine. What this
entailed was a £2.5 billion cut in expenditure and the sale of
£500 million worth of British Petroleum shares to reduce the
government borrowing requirement.
1977 to 1979.
This final period of office saw the, "use of published M3 
as an overriding constraint upon other aspects of policy,
96 James Callaghan, speech to Labour Party Conference 
September 1976, reported in The Times. September 29th 1976, 
p.l.
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which continued to be conducted broadly along Keynesian 
lines.1,97
Although the economy did make a limited recovery during 
1977 and 1978 the party was now deeply divided over the 
direction to take. The leadership remained highly cautious in 
the remainder of their term. Reflationary Keynesian policies 
were again adopted, but only with an overriding awareness by 
the government of the level of monetary expansion.
The consequence of the economic trials of the 1974-79 
government was the clear definition of internal divisions. 
While the 1979 election manifesto reflected the leadership 
view of economic moderation, with the radicalism of 1973 
having disappeared, the party was not united behind it. A 
parliamentary rump and a majority at the constituency level 
openly called for a return to traditional socialist policies.
It is clear from the examination of the 1974-79 
government, that the failure of British economic policy in the 
post war period can be seen as providing the root of the 
division in the Labour Party. Other areas of division existed 
such as defence, membership of the European Community, and 
internal democracy in the party, but the main split between 
fight and left was over the direction of economic policy. The 
long-term failure of British economic policy meant a new 
direction had to be found. The Conservatives became high­
97 J.S. Fforde, "Setting Monetary Objectives," Bank of 
England Quarterly Review. June 1983 pp.200-208.
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jacked by monetarists under the Thatcher leadership. Labour 
became divided.
Due to the very fact that it was in government, Labour's 
parliamentary leadership was able to dominate the construction 
of the 1979 election manifesto. This proved to be only a 
short-term victory in two respects. First, Callaghan 
antagonized party activists and union leaders due to his 
failure to consult with them on the party's policy positions. 
The manifesto was almost a hand-written statement from the 
Prime Minister, offering little consolation to the left. In 
failing to include conference resolutions, such as the pledge 
to abolish the House of Lords, he appeared only to distance 
the leadership from the party as a whole. The left saw this 
as representing indifference to rank-and-file preferences and 
a widening of the gap between trade unions and the leadership. 
Relations between the leadership and union heads had already 
been strained as the unionists felt deceived by Callaghan into 
expecting ah Autumn 1978 election. The hostility which 
followed in the,"Winter of Discontent," which saw the unions 
refusing to accept the government's 5% wage increase, only 
heightened the breakdown in relations and further weakened the 
leadership's position within the party. Simultaneously, the 
unions felt pressure from the left, assisting their move away 
from their traditionally moderate position of the early 1960s.
Secondly, and more significantly, the 1979 election saw 
Labour suffer its worst electoral defeat in 48 years. The
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Conservatives offered a new hope, with the promise of attacks 
on inflation, crime and the trade unions. They were not 
elected because of the new economic theory being offered 
through monetarism, but because of Labour's failure. Winning 
only 37.0% of the popular vote, almost 7% less than the 
Tories, Labour suffered its worst electoral defeat of the 
modern era.
While a party in government is likely to hold together 
under stress, one removed from office is likely to look for 
scape-goats and explanations. Out of office the Labour Party 
faced a period of self-analysis. As the left protested the 
betrayal of socialism and a failure to implement conference 
decisions, their period of ascendancy had begun. The 1979 
election defeat set in motion the factional battles Which 
resulted in the left securing control of the party leadership, 
and a minority on the right no longer willing to continue the 
fight from within the party. The creation of the Social 
Democratic Party in January 1981 represented the decision of 
an internal faction to cease the battle for influence within 
the party structure and establish its own, new external 
relations.
Ian Bradely sees the period from May 1979 to January 1981 
representing the coming together of three different groups to 
allow the split in the party.98 First came EEC Commissioner,
98 See Ian Bradley Breaking the Mould-The Birth and 
Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Oxford: Robertson, 
1981, p.47.
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and former deputy leader, Roy Jenkins' return from Brussels. 
In his Dimbleby lecture he gave a clear indication of his own 
readiness for a break with Labour." This was by no means 
crucial to the split, as Jenkins' own hostility towards many 
of his party colleagues had long since been known. It did 
however give a signal to others who were already restless.
Secondly, future supporters of the SDP were rallying 
around the country. The Social Democratic Alliance was 
formed, becoming a federation of local social democratic 
groups in June 1979 without the requirement that its 
supporters be members of the Labour Party.
The third group, which must be seen as the key group, was 
the Gang of Three. This comprised three leading Labour 
politicians, Shirley Williams, Bill Rogers, and former foreign 
secretary David Owen. It was this group which could provide 
the necessary media focus and high profile for a new party, as 
well as having the ability to bring with it other supporters 
from Westminster. The Gang of Three are of central concern, 
because by understanding why they were provoked into leaving 
the party they had served for so long it is possible to 
appreciate the factional battles which changed the direction 
of the party.
In the post-1979 election period Tony Benn increasingly
99 The Dimbleby lecture was a highly publicized annual 
lecture given by a leading political figure. In 1979 it was 
Roy Jenkins who was invited to give the lecture, which he used 
as the opportunity to announce his readiness to break away 
from Labour.
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identified with the left's fight for constitutional reform of 
the party. Having refused a shadow-cabinet position, Benn 
argued, along with militant activists, that MP's alone should 
not have the power to elect the party leader. The ideological 
gap between party leadership and party activists clearly 
became greater as activists called for more accountability and 
internal party democracy— obviously to their advantage.
The ascendancy of the left is demonstrated by the series 
of conference resolutions passed between 1979 and 1981. The 
October 1979 Conference voted for the introduction of 
mandatory reselection for MPs. For many who later joined the 
SDP this proved to be decisive. Sitting MPs would now have to 
submit themselves for renomination at least once every 
parliament. The right-wing of the party argued that this 
would simply make MPs delegates of the local General 
Management Committees, which were increasingly dominated by 
the left. This was treated as an abandonment of the 
principles of representative democracy. MPs would ho longer 
be representing the interests of their constituents but would 
be dominated by the concerns and demands of local party 
activists.
This decision was followed by the first special Wembley 
Conference in May 1980, which saw the endorsement of the 
document 'Peace, Jobs and Freedom', constructed by the left. 
This was strongly pro-unilateralist and anti-EEC document, 
envisioning an economic policy dependent on import controls
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and a rejection of incomes policy.100
The election of Michael Foot, a traditional ally of the 
left, as party leader in the Autumn of 1980 was further 
evidence to the social democrats of an ideological shift and 
defeat. Had Dennis Healey been successful in his bid for the 
leadership, readiness to support him in a continued battle for 
control of the party may well have been greater. However, 
with the party now supporting withdrawal from the EEC, 
unilateral disarmament and further nationalization, the social 
democrats found themselves diametrically opposed to the 
policies of their own party.
The second Wembley Conference in January 1981 
institutionalized the power of the left. Endorsed were the 
new electoral college for the selection of leader, providing 
for an extension of the union block vote. The alternative 
proposal of the right for one man one vote was soundly 
defeated. This proved the final catalyst for breakaway. The 
Limehouse Declaration101 followed almost immediately, and 
only a week later the launch of the SDP.
The split in the party was by no means a short-term
100 It is interesting to note that at this conference 
David Owen was booed and hissed as he attempted to defend the 
principle of multilateralism. This is said to have a 
substantial effect on his own determination to fight for 
social democratic principles from within the party, and 
enhanced his willingness to look increasingly for an external 
solution.
101 The Limehouse Declaration came from Jenkins, Williams, 
Owen and Rogers confirmed their inability to support the 
Labour Party in future.
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phenomenon. By the time of the 1974 election factionalized 
pressure was already substantial, and had Labour not been 
elected deeper divisions would have emerged far sooner. As it 
was, the 1974-79 period was key to the seeming failure of the 
moderates in government and, to the establishment of an 
alternative power base for the left through the constituency, 
and ultimately the conference. When this strength was 
combined with union support, the moderates found themselves 
powerless. The constitution of the party allowed for the 
development of more than one power center, which the left 
successfully exploited.
The 1979-81 period confirmed the new dominance of the 
left. Without the responsibilities of office, it was able to 
take control of the party and change the policy direction. 
The loss of the factional control to the left meant that a 
breakaway was the only option for some on the right, but by no 
means all. Most members of the center and right remained loyal 
to the party. The left was in clear ascendancy at the time of 
the 1983 election campaign, but enough moderates remained to 
fight another day.
For the bulk of its term, the first Thatcher government 
struggled badly in opinion polls. Both Labour and the newly 
formed Alliance102 held comfortable leads in popularity
102 An electoral alliance was formed between the new SDP 
and the Liberal party, located between Labour and the 
Conservatives on the political spectrum. While the parties 
remained separate they did not compete against each other in 
any electoral constituency.
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terms. By 1981 Britain faced its worst post-war recession as 
unemployment rocketed first to three million, and then 
approached four. Mrs.Thatcher became the most unpopular 
prime-minister since polling records began and the 
Conservatives seemed certain to face defeat. They were saved 
by two factors. The Falklands War arrived during 1982 to 
transform Mrs.Thatcher1s image in to a strong and unshakable 
leader. More significantly the Conservatives were saved by 
the ineptness of Labour.
Labour under the Left.
Once the left had taken control of nearly all areas 
within the party, including the leadership, it confirmed the 
change in external policy direction. The 1983 election 
manifesto envisaged Britain taking a true socialist path. 
Nationalization would be greatly expanded, while membership of 
the EEC would be halted. When pressed on where Britain's 
trading future would lie, Michael Foot responded that links 
with the Eastern European states would now be explored. 
Unilateralism was to be the party's defence policy, with 
Britain abandoning its nuclear deterrent at the height of the 
new cold war. Labour was offering the country its most left- 
wing government ever, four years after the selection of the 
most right-wing. The party plunged in opinion polls, 
ultimately fighting with the Alliance for the mantle of main 
opposition.
Although the Conservatives were successful in reducing
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inflation, their professed economic priority, they were still 
reelected in 1983 in the middle of an economic recession. Not 
only were they reelected they were returned with an increased 
House of Commons majority, from 44 to 144. In terms of the 
popular vote, the Tories led Labour by 14.8%. The Labour vote 
collapsed to only 27.6%, only two percentage points more than 
the Alliance. It appeared that Labour might be about to be 
passed as the official opposition party in Britain.
Labour had failed to make electoral gains out of the 
issue of unemployment, and on other economic issues they were 
not trusted. The new policies constructed since the 1979 
election were thoroughly rejected by the electorate. The 
party's humiliation meant that it was once again thrown into 
an immediate electoral post-mortem. Media opinion held that 
the leftward direction the party had undertaken ensured their 
defeat. The immediate reaction of many within the party was 
that the leftward march must stop. With the left's control of 
the bulk of the party's institutions this could only be a long 
and slow process.
The 1983 defeat gave a new factional impetus to the 
moderates. The left had failed in a spectacular manner, 
allowing, under the Dual Advisory Theory, a fresh change in 
factional control. However, as was the case with the rise of 
the left, the process would be a long one. The stranglehold 
the hard left had secured meant that no quick shift back 
towards a the right could occur. Factional supporters from
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the center and right of the party were joined by moderates on 
the left in a long-term attempt to salvage the party's 
electoral future. The whole process of factional change had 
to occur, once again, internally, before major external 
changes in policy could be achieved.
What the 1983 general election did for many in the Labour 
movement was convince them that the party's survival could 
only be guaranteed by a shift away from the left. Under the 
then current electoral conditions in Britain, only a Labour 
party heading towards the center could be successful. While 
such a motion certainly carried a Downsian appearance, of 
greater significance were the internal battles again to be 
fought and the party's response to the successful Thatcherite 
agenda.
CHAPTER IV 
LABOUR'S ELECTORAL VIABILITY
From the moment of his election to the position of party 
leader in 1984, Neil Kinnock embarked upon a long-term process 
of modernization. At the outset he himself had no knowledge 
of the extent of the reforms he would drive through the party. 
As he took over the party's most senior office he remained a 
traditional associate of the left and of socialism. In 1986 
he published 'Making Our Own Way' in which he stressed the 
need for government economic planning, while making a 
commitment to social ownership and the government taking 
shares in private enterprises.103 By 1992 he was leading a 
party committed to the development of small business, as well 
as one which had long since forgotten its hostility towards 
the European Community.
As the two chapters following this will demonstrate, the 
Kinnock modernization process was a long and gradual one. For 
a party to take such a continuous journey across the political 
spectrum was previously unknown in British politics. The new 
leader did not begin with the goal of producing the most 
right-wing Labour Party ever, but with the goal of defeating 
the extreme left-wing of the party and making Labour 
electorally competitive again. With regard to this goal, the
103Ibid., p. 186.
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question which was asked several times during the 1980*s was 
whether it was ever attainable. Regardless of any changes the 
party might undertake, had the sociological make-up of British 
society changed, and been changed by the succession of 
Thatcher governments, as to leave Labour unelectable?
Prior to the examination of the Kinnock modernization 
process, this chapter seeks to answer this question. With 
their fourth consecutive election defeat in 1992, is the 
Labour party now unelectable in any metamorphosis? Record 
defeats for the party in 1979 and 1983 were followed by 
improved results for the changing party in 1987 and 1992. 
However, even in the midst of the 1992 recession, the 
Conservatives secured a solid victory over the 'new* Labour 
Party. The 1992 contest will be examined in detail in the 
final section of this study, while this chapter concentrates 
on the elections to 1987.
Winning 37% of the vote in the 1979 general election was 
seen as such as disaster by many in the Labour Party that its 
whole policy direction was changed in the following years. 
With the left dominating the 1983 election manifesto, the 
Party plunged to only 27.6% of the popular vote. In terms of 
average votes per constituency contested, Labour had made its 
worst electoral performance ever. Only the British electoral 
system saved Labour from, at best, sharing the title of
80
Official Opposition with the Alliance.104 With the disaster 
of 1983 it was clear to the vast majority both inside and 
outside the party that major policy and personnel reforms must 
follow if Labour was to have any hope of survival. From 1984 
Neil Kinnock began to implement such reforms. By May 1986 
Labour had an 8% lead in opinion polls over the government. 
Was the party again viable?
The June 1987 election result proved a disappointment to 
many in the party. After having led the Conservatives for 
much of the second Thatcher government the hope was that a 
respectable performance would be made, even though Britain was 
enjoying a short-term economic boom. As it was, Labour 
collected only 30.8% of the national vote, with a Conservative 
popular vote victory of 12.5%. The Tories maintained a 
majority in the House of Commons of more than 100 seats over 
all other parties. Labour had improved its showing in 1987, 
but had still suffered its second worst electoral defeat ever. 
The very fact that Kinnock had been successful in modernizing 
the party to a degree by this time, with commentators 
stressing the highly professional campaign mounted by Labour, 
only increased questions about Labour ever again being viable.
104Had a proportional representation system been in 
operation it is almost certain that Labour would have been 
relegated to third place in British politics, and quite 
possibly to future electoral oblivion. Although the popular 
vote did see the party collect two percentage points more than 
the Alliance, the plurality system encouraged a substantial 
number of voters not to vote for the Alliance even though it 
was their first choice.
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It was argued that if a reformed Labour Party could still not 
reach a position to challenge the Conservatives, then its 
electoral problems must be far more than political. Had 
sociological changes occurred to such an extent that, 
regardless of what was performed at the national level, Labour 
could not win an election? To answer this it is necessary to 
examine the sociological changes which have occurred in 
Britain over the past two decades.
Sociological Factors.
Between 1945 and 1970, Labour*s popular support at the 
national ballot box never fell below 40%. Since 1970 it has 
exceeded 40% only once, and then only by 0.2%. Many 
explanations of this continual decline have been offered in 
terms of social changes: Labour's core support group, the
working class, is said to have been shrinking; the 
Conservative stronghold group of the middle class has been 
expanding? class as a whole is said to have become less 
significant? a growth has occurred in home ownership and a 
parallel decline in council house tenancy? the electorate has 
become more rational with regard to voting? union membership 
has declined, and the Thatcher government carried out a 
wholesale expansion of popular capitalism. In deciphering 
such arguments two major areas must be considered. 
Traditionally, Labour was seen as the party representing 
working-class interests, the Conservatives the middle-class. 
It was suggested that the proportionate size of the working-
class had shrunk to such an extent by the 1980s, that a Labour 
victory built upon this core support group became impossible. 
Alternatively the proposition was posed that Conservative 
policy, most notably the sale of council houses, had won the 
government the support of traditional Labour supporters, thus 
cutting away Labour support amongst traditional groups.
Looking first at the question of a declining working- 
class, Heath et al establish 5 different class groups by the 
use of employment patterns.105
(The five are managerial, routine non-manual, petty 
bourgeoisie, blue collar elite, and working class). Discussed 
are the proportions of the electorate which construct these 
groups and how they have changed between 1964 and 1983. What 
Heath et al discover is that the proportions in the first two 
groups, groups expected to favor the Conservatives with 
political support, increase substantially. They grew from 18% 
each to 27% and 24% respectively.106 By contrast, the final 
two groups, presumed Labour identifiers, fell from 10% and 47% 
to 7% and 34% respectively.107 Classes associated with Labour 
support clearly declined. A second survey108 confirms this 
trend. It compares economic activity in 1951 with that in
105 See Anthony Heath, et al. p. 29.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 See Heath,A and S.MacDonald, "Social Change and the 
future of the Left." Political Quarterly. Vol.58, 1987, 
pp.364-377.
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1981. The percentage employed in white collar work during this 
time doubled, while the proportion of manual workers in the 
workforce fell from 62% to 45%. The electoral consequences of 
such changes would not benefit Labour.
These figures do demonstrate that the class structure in 
Britain has changed. Heath et al go on to make calculations 
as to the total impact of this change on voting. While it is 
true that the electorate is now more middle class and more 
educated, social changes have not been so great as to create 
a 13% drop in Labour's share of popular support between 1964 
and 1987. While conceding that social changes may account for 
some of the long-run changes in voting, Heath et al estimate 
only an overall shift equating to a 2.7% growth in 
Conservative support, a 4% loss for Labour and a 1.8% increase 
for the Alliance or center party. This data does not offer an 
adequate explanation for the last four election results.
An alternative sociological explanation is that the 
electorate became 'Thatcherite.1109 The argument forwarded 
was that due to the policies of the Thatcher governments, 
traditional class voting loyalties were broken down. Voter 
socialization was said to no longer apply. Evidence 
demonstrates that this was not the case. Heath et al do 
identify a slow decline in the percentage holding a specific 
party identification. When the figures for those with a "very
109 See Ivor Crewe, "Has the Electorate become 
Thatcherite," in Robert Skidelsky, Thatcherism. London: Chatto 
and Windus, 1988.
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strong" and "strong identification" are combined the fall for 
the Conservatives is from 89% in 1964 to 77% in 1987, and for 
Labour 89% to 73%. In addition to this, they find a 25% drop 
among those with a very strong party identification during 
this same period.110 While party identification is still 
significant, its decline is unquestioned. From this it can be 
concluded that voters are less tied to traditional party 
allegiances, leaving them free to vote on issues other than 
automatic party identification.
Heath et al argue however, that issues have always been 
significant over the past 25 years. In the early 1960s, they 
suggest, voters were influenced, rather than constrained by, 
childhood socialization, but while party identification did 
exist, the party line was followed no closer than today. 
Electoral stability was maintained not by party loyalty alone 
but also by stable attitudes in the electorate. When parties 
do not change, stable attitudes result. Overall volatility 
was far higher between 1979 and 1983, when parties were 
perceived to have changed substantially, than between 1983 and 
1987. Heath et al demonstrate that overall volatility of 
voters between elections has not increased by any great 
extent, being only 6% greater between 1983/87 than 1966/70. 
They suggest that the availability of a third party in the 
1980s may well have been enough to explain the volatility— as 
opposed to any growth in vote switching.
110 Heath et al. p. 53.
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From this it can be suggested that voters today are today 
no more nor less likely to break from party allegiance than 
they were 25 years ago. What this means for the current 
Labour Party is that if voters voted, at least in part, on 
issues in the 1960s when Labour was able to enjoy electoral 
success, no reason exists why this should not be repeated in 
the 1990s— providing the party can make a popular issue 
appeal.
A similar pattern is found when specific Thatcherite 
policies are examined. It has been argued that the sale of 
council houses was a policy designed by the Conservative 
government for its believed electoral benefits. Home owners 
were thought to be far more likely to vote Tory than council 
tenants. However, while it is true that housing does have a 
significant relationship to vote, Labour lost votes among 
working class owner-occupiers and local authority tenants 
alike. Factors which caused Labour to lose votes amongst the 
working class affected both these groups alike.
Public attitudes towards central Thatcherite principles 
also fail to support the proposition that there was a shift in 
ideological support. In 1979 13% believed that welfare
benefit was too low, but by 1987 this had risen to 54%. In 
1980 50% believed inflation should be the main economic
objective, but by 1986 75% believed unemployment should be, 
even if it meant an increased rate of inflation. In 1979 
equal numbers wanted increases in public expenditure and tax
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cuts, but in 1987 six times more wanted expenditure 
increases.111 From these statistics Ivor Crewe reaches a 
conclusion that the electorate was not transformed to believe 
in Thatcherite principles.112 Instead Tory electoral success 
was based upon the promise of strong government, and political 
circumstance.
From these arguments it can be concluded that while 
limited changes have occurred in relative class size, little 
change has occurred in the electorates sociological character. 
Class changes are not an adequate explanation of Labour*s 
electoral failures. The fact that in both 1983 and 1987 
Labour lost votes to the Alliance in all classes means that 
relative class voting has remained largely unchanged. Labour 
remained through the 198 0s proportionately stronger amongst 
working class voters, but saw a loss of support across the 
social spectrum, not just in the working class.
This evidence demonstrates that sociological explanations
of Labour's failure are far from conclusive. Changes in the
;
size of social classes did have an adverse effect upon Labour, 
but not to such an extent as to consign it to electoral doom. 
At the same time social attitudes were not captured by the 
Thatcherite right, leaving elections to be fought on political 
grounds. What Labour needed to do after the 1987 election was
111 Ibid.
112 Ivor Crewe, Political Communications: The General
Election Campaign of 1983. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986.
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to increase its political popularity across the social 
spectrum.
Political Factors.
In explaining the Conservative hat-trick of victories 
between 1979 and 1987 political, as opposed to sociological, 
explanations are key. Considering first the 1979 ballot it is 
beyond dispute that the 1974-79 government had faced major 
obstacles during its term of office. The inflationary 
struggles of the mid-1970s had a definite effect on the 
party's electoral prospects. Although by late 1978 the 
situation had vastly improved, the "Winter of Discontent" 
removed hopes of further electoral success. The 1979 election 
represented the simple rejection by the electorate of a 
government adjudged to have failed. A Conservative Party 
promising to take office and assault both inflation and the 
trade unions appeared a very pleasant alternative. Labour was 
rejected in 1979, and the Tories were embraced as the only 
possible alternative. By 1983 the self-destruction of Labour 
was in full swing. While other factors certainly played a 
role in the election result, Labour's weakness had a direct 
effect in a three fold manner.
1: The Conservatives were left without any viable
opposition. With Labour members busy fighting each other, and 
the Alliance hampered by the plurality system, Mrs.Thatcher1s 
government really did appear the only choice for Britain. 
Since the 1982 budget economic expectations had substantially
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increased, rallying support for the Conservatives.113 
2: For the 1983 election Labour was offering the electorate
its most left-wing platform ever. With policies such as 
withdrawal from the EEC, unilateral nuclear disarmament and 
pledges from the party leader to open up trade links with 
Eastern Europe, defeat was predictable.
3: The division of the party and the creation of the
Alliance left the opposition vote severely divided. Labour 
was seen to lack real credibility and suffered from a poor 
leader and campaign that were both treated with disdain.
By 1987 Britain was enjoying one of its greatest periods 
of post-war prosperity. While it lasted only a short time, 
and has been paid for almost ever since, it did leave the 
government in a very strong position. While the Conservatives
113 The Falklands War of 1982 did help the Conservative 
Party in terms of electoral appeal, but it was not key in 
their electoral success. David Sanders, Hugh Wood and David 
Marsh, "Government Popularity and the Falklands War: A
Reassessment," British Journal of Political Science. Vol.17, 
part III, 1987, pp.281-313, concludes that the war gave the 
government a 3% boost in support for three months during 1982. 
By June 1983 its effects were not significant, with support 
for the Conservatives already rallying in the wake of the 1982 
budget. Increased personal economic expectations, were 
combining with the weakness of the opposition to drive the
growing support of the government. Sanders et al conclude
that the war was "inconsequential" in the Conservative
victory.
Harold Clarke, William Mishler and Paul Whiteley, 
"Recapturing the Falklands: Models in Conservative Popularity, 
1979-83," British Journal of Political Science. 1990, part II, 
pp.63-81, re-examines this matter. While concluding that the 
war had benificial effects on Mrs. Thatcher*s image and the 
electorates judgement of her as prime minister, it conceedes 
that by the 1983 vote "the war's direct impact had
dissipated."
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may not have performed as well as Labour in the days 
immediately prior to voting, by this time the election was 
already secure. The work of Miller et al114 supports this 
with their demonstration of the importance of both the long 
and short-term political campaigns. If social changes had 
occurred to such an extent as to make the Labour Party no 
longer electorally viable, the campaign process, lasting over 
18 months, would have seen little change in the support of the 
parties. What Miller et al demonstrate is the important role 
political factors played during this period in the adjustment 
of electoral support. They demonstrate that during the 'long- 
campaign* the government was able to solidify its position.
The long-campaign is seen as beginning in early 1986, at 
a time which found the Conservatives in deep political 
trouble, most notably with the Westland affair. However, even 
with this problem, the government was only 6% behind in 
opinion polls, by no means a disastrous mid-term position. In 
terms of the British Social Attitudes survey they trailed 
Labour by only 1%, clearly suggesting good long-term 
prospects.115 While the government had problems, Labour 
still suffered a credibility gap in terms of governing. 
Although Neil Kinnock had shown increasing competency in 
reforming the party, the electorate still needed convincing of
114 See William Miller, et al. How Voters Change. The 1987 
British Election Campaign in Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990.
115 Ibid. , p.55.
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the party's governing ability. In organizing a widely praised 
campaign effort, the party was not only serving the purpose of 
electioneering, but equally importantly it was demonstrating 
an ability to act as a coherent body. Having a reputation for 
disorganization meant the party had to campaign in an 
exceptional manner, even before it could be considered by the 
electorate as a real alternative.
The government knew that their support was greatest 
amongst the expanding sectors of the population, such as the 
self-employed salariat, home-owners and non-trade unionists, 
and consequently directed policy towards them. Through the 
very fact that it is in government, the governing party tends 
to have an advantage in a pre-election period. Manipulation 
of political events and the economy are open to it for 
electoral gain.
While Labour was indeed successful in organizing to a 
superior level during the long-campaign, it was the 
Conservatives who made the greater gains due to their position 
in government. The key to this success was the economic 
manipulation they carried out with cuts in income tax in both 
1986 and 1987 (by 2 percent in the later year) , along with 
public expenditure increases. This combined with an inflation 
rate which appeared to be well under control and unemployment 
which was consistently falling. Although unemployment had 
only just dipped below 3 million by election day, the 
Conservatives had successfully lowered the expectations of the
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electorate in this area in terms of employment norms. Further 
to this, they had continually altered the method of 
calculation, or "fixed the figures," to exaggerate a downward 
trend, which they regularly stressed. While balance of 
payments deficits increased, the electorate had little concern 
with a phenomenon they could not see as they enj oyed the 
Lawson boom.
It was during the winter of 1986/7 that Miller et al see 
the Conservatives making their greatest gains. Between 
November 1986 and the following March they were able to 
manufacture approval of their economic performance, purely for 
short-term electoral advantage. The shift in economic optimism 
was greatest amongst those who were already inclined to vote 
Conservative, but this optimism was then communicated to 
others. This optimism peaked for the June ballot, and was 
gone soon after. Had Mrs.Thatcher chosen to wait until the 
Autumn of 1987 for the ballot, coinciding with the stock 
market crash, the level of optimism would have been very 
different. The economic prosperity proved to be of political, 
not economic, advantage. The Lawson boom was achieved in 
classic Keynesian style with tax cuts to increase spending, 
coupled with low interest rates to allow Mr. Lawson's 
shadowing of the D-Mark. Stored up was massive inflation, 
further exacerbated by a substantial government injection of 
spending into the economy after the crash. While the 
Conservatives totally misjudged the economy, fuelling it up
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for the election and then continuing to do so after the vote, 
the episode demonstrates the advantageous position a 
government can find itself in the run up to a ballot.
With regard to the short final campaign the emphasis is on 
maintaining a position and not losing ground. Miller et al 
demonstrate that during this final period voter considerations 
did change, although the polls appeared largely stable. The 
fact is that movements largely cancelled each other out, 
although issues and leaders were clearly significant.
What we can perceive is that while the period may have 
appeared stable, the potential for significant changes in 
fortune was present. Alignment between voters and parties was 
sufficiently weak as to cause fluctuations of considerable 
impact. 1987 was not an exception to this, but the movements 
simply cancelled each other out.
This chapter demonstrates that political factors 
conspired to ensure three successive electoral defeats for 
Labour. By 1992 these factors had again shifted to leave the 
two main parties running neck-and-neck and an election too 
close to call throughout the campaign. Labour was successful 
in adjusting to the political climate in the UK, with Kinnock 
modernizing the party and moving to the center ground to 
achieve electoral viability. The fact that Labour could hold 
a 25%116 lead in opinion polls in Spring 1990 clearly
116 See Gallup poll for The Daily Telegraph. April 6th, 
1990, p.l.
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demonstrates that political fluctuations can easily overturn 
any cumulatively minor social changes and determine electoral 
success.
CHAPTER V 
INTERNAL REFORM, 1983-1987.
The challenge which Labour faced on the morning of June 
10th 1983 was of reestablishing itself as the main opposition 
to the Conservatives, and as a realistic alternative in 
government. The task was not an impossible one. Although the 
1983 election left the party in the weakest position since its 
foundation, Labour failures were largely political. A 
reformed and modernized party would have the opportunity to 
reverse the decline.
This chapter explores the initial stages of the party 
reform which centered on a fresh shift in factional control, 
with the decline of the left, and the construction of a new 
image of managerial competence. The Kinnock modernization 
strategy came to be centered on three areas. Internally, a 
new level of leadership control was established at the 
national level, through a soft left/right alliance. Secondly 
the party's image was reformed, with the aim of presenting the 
image of a team and leader ready for government and for the 
trust of the nation. The final stage of the Kinnock-led 
reforms came in the shape of major policy changes following 
the 1987 election, which are examined in the following 
chapter.
Although Neil Kinnock's election to the position of
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party leader in 1983, as part of the 'dream ticket'117 with 
Roy Hattersley, signified the start of major reforms, changes 
in internal factional strengths had already begun to occur. 
The weakening of the left's grip on the party dates back to 
Michael Foot's selection as leader in 1981.
1981-1983.
1981 proved to be the pinnacle of achievement for the 
left of the party. Having built up support, first, at the 
constituency level, and then from the unions, the left now 
secured control of the party's premier office. What it now 
needed was a period of internal calm to allow concentration on 
external battles.118 The changes in policy which the left 
brought had to be communicated to the electorate. In reality, 
the party in-fighting continued, first with the break by the 
SDP and then with divisions amongst the left. Seyd 
writes,"Intra-Party politics were at their most intense and 
the electorate were treated as mere passive bystanders."119
117 Kinnock and Hattersley were the two leading contenders 
for the leadership position following the resignation of 
Michael Foot. Once Kinnock was successful, the combination of 
the two in the leader and deputy role seemed to have the ideal 
electoral and party balance. Kinnock from the left could 
carry the bulk of the party with him, while Hattersley from 
the right demonstrated the new direction the party had now 
undertaken. Consequently many party insiders saw the two 
combining as the dream ticket.
118 See Patrick Seyd, The Rise and Fall of the Labour
Left. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1987, p.134.
119 Ibid., p.159.
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Only months after the left's success divisions in the 
party were once again gashed open with Tony Benn challenging 
Dennis Healey for the post of deputy leader. Benn, the long­
time darling of the radical left, believed his strong support 
at the constituency level could ensure the defeat of the 
right-wing's Healey. At a time when the party needed a united 
front for external battles, the "election campaign developed 
into a bitter five-month clash between Left and Right which 
undermined the Party's electoral base."120 As a consequence 
party support fell by 7% between July and December 1981.
As Benn launched his challenge he entered into a series 
of public disputes with Michael Foot. Benn opposed Foot's 
efforts to persuade MPs defecting to the SDP to remain loyal, 
because he wanted the party to move in a true socialist 
direction. Such possible defectors would not be welcome. In 
making the attempts Foot realized the need for unity if the 
party were to have a long-term future. Simultaneously he 
sought unity by publicly appealing to Benn not to stand in a 
deputy contest. His calls fell on deaf ears and the left 
divided.
When Callaghan was leader, and seen as a representative 
of the right, the left tended to unite in opposition. Now, 
with left wing control of the party, many on the soft left 
were unable to associate themselves with the radical militancy 
associated with Benn and the Bennites. Men such as Neil
120 Ibid. , p. 160.
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Kinnock found themselves identifying more with the center than 
the radical left.
The first indication of a new shift in the balance of 
power in the party, away from the hard left to the center and 
right, came with elections to the party's National Executive 
later in 1981. A trade union-led offensive allowed six new 
members to be elected with right-wing party credentials.
The second strike against the left came with the 
retirement of Reg Underhill as the Party's National Agent. 
For a number of years Underhill had charged that Trotskyite 
infiltrators were operating inside the party. This 
contravened the party's constitution which forbids groups 
within the party having their own agendas and programs outside 
the official party program.121 The NEC had consistently 
rejected such charges, so on his retirement Underhill 
published a 29 page document entitled, 'The Entryist 
Activities of the Militant Tendency.'
The result of this was a soft left/right coalition on the 
NEC securing an inquiry in to the charges. The Hayward-Hughes 
report proposed that all non-affiliated groups made up of 
party members must apply for registration, giving details of 
their aims and organization. The NEC accepted the proposals, 
which were seen as an attack on the hard left. It was 
concluded that Militant Group members were ineligible for 
party membership, but problems of secrecy and definition left
121 See Labour Party Constitution Clause II Section (3).
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this impossible to enforce. The only expulsions were of the 
five-person editorial board of the Militant newspaper, but, 
"the issue had now caused considerable disunity within the 
Labour Left."122
The expulsions were followed by a direct attack by Foot 
on Peter Tatchell, the party candidate selected by the 
Bermondsey CLP for the constituency's upcoming byelection. 
Tatchell was unquestionably a supporter of the hard left, but 
was not, in all likelihood, the Trotskyite Foot accused him of 
being. The NEC refused to confirm his selection, although 
Tatchell remained the choice due to constituency backing. 
Tatchell was defeated in the by-election vote by SDP candidate 
Simon Hughes, but the whole incident further demonstrated the 
divisions in the left which were already in existence.
While many in the party supported the expulsions and Foot's 
actions, the hard left feared a revival of centrist domination 
of the party, for so-long the obstacle to their policy 
aspirations. What the divisions produced was a generation of 
media attention for the Militant group, which their relatively 
small size in no way warranted. Their lack of numbers did not 
stop the Tory press seizing upon the opportunity to create the 
party's 'Loony Left' image, leaving the new leadership facing 
a substantial problem. The whole of the party faced being 
tarred with the same brush as a militant few.
One advantage produced by these events for the new
122 Seyd, p. 164.
99
Kinnock leadership was the opportunity to take on a divided 
opposition. A second advantage for the new leader, and more 
importantly, was the party's massacre at the polls in 1983. 
This was as clear an indication as possible that the left's 
policies, such as high taxation, unilateral nuclear 
disarmament, and withdrawal from the EEC, had alienated even 
traditional Labour supporters. Although Patrick Seyd123 does 
suggest that had the left concentrated more on wining the 
support of the electorate and less on party activists they may 
have had more electoral success, the perceived picture in June 
1983 was the left-wing policies had almost destroyed the 
party. What was needed now was unity behind fresh leadership. 
1983-1987.
Following the party's, and his own personal, humiliation 
in the 1983 ballot Michael Foot resigned as party leader 
almost immediately. The race to succeed him was run between 
Kinnock and Hattersley. From the beginning it was clear that 
the Welshman would easily triumph. This was confirmed when he 
collected over 70% of all votes cast in the October ballot.
Kinnock was a candidate from the center-left. His long­
term allegiances had been with the left of his party but never 
with Militant. The very reason he proved so successful in the 
contest, and ultimately in guiding the party through internal 
reforms, was because his home was on the left. As the party 
platform shifted from left to right in subsequent years,
123 Seyd, p. 159.
Kinnock personally went through the changes in policy and 
principle that his party platform did. His success was built 
upon this very fact. The left accepted the harsh realities of 
reform only because they were taught them by one of their own. 
Had a representative of the right been selected in 1983 and 
then attempted to preach reforms to the left, rebellion would 
have ensued.
The size of the electoral college vote which Kinnock 
secured allowed him to claim a far greater party mandate than 
any of his predecessors. He was now head of a party far more 
receptive to strong leadership due to the obvious need to 
reform and unite. With the soft left being aware of the 
threat Militant would pose to any future election prospects, 
they were far more willing to see a reassertion of central 
control and a move to the right. For Kinnock, "Unity was a 
primary aim. But modernization and change were the overriding 
imperatives from the outset."124
If electoral fortunes were to revive, Kinnock knew that 
the Militant stranglehold around Labour's neck must be 
removed. To do this he needed his own support base, which he 
consciously set about constructing. His priority was an 
alliance on the NEC between the soft left and the right to 
back him in a challenge to Militant.125
124 Colin Hughes and Patrick Wintour, Labour Rebuilt. The 
New Model Party. London: Fourth Estate, 1990, p.7.
125 Ibid. See chapter 1, "1983-1987 The First Time 
Around".
101
A supporting alliance with the NEC reduced the 
possibility of challenges to the leadership growing out of 
alternative power bases. This may appear an obvious tactic to 
employ, but previous leaders such as Wilson and Callaghan had 
neglected such action. The consequence for them had been the 
left securing a grip on many of the party's policy making 
institutions. As Kinnock built the soft left/right alliance 
on the NEC and established a partnership between the NEC and 
the Shadow Cabinet as the core policy body, the hard left 
became isolated within the party.
Challenging Militant.
Neil Kinnock was always opposed to the Militant Tendency 
within his party. Despite this distaste, during the first two 
years of his leadership he resisted a direct attack upon them. 
He knew that any future assault would only be possible if he 
could first work to secure his own position and win the 
confidence of the soft left. With this done, he was well 
aware that a challenge to Militant had to come. The media 
portrayal of the hard left of the Labour party was such that 
a large number in the electorate were genuinely fearful of 
what a Labour electoral victory would mean. Once in office 
would the extremists assert control of the government? The 
bulk of the tabloid press, and some not so tabloid, would have 
the electorate believe that the answer was yes. Even if 
nationally it did not constitute a highly significant number, 
Militant was hurting the long-term electoral prospects of
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Labour. For the modernization strategy to be successful it 
had to be purged.
Kinnock used his party conference speech in the fall of 
1985 to launch a direct assault on the Militant stronghold of 
Liverpool City Council on Merseyside. Kinnock began his 
savage attack by claiming, "Impossible policies start with far 
fetched resolutions. They are then pickled into rigid dogma 
and go through the years outdated, misplaced and irrelevant to 
the real needs of our people."126 He spoke directly of the 
Liverpool council and the "grotesque scene" of a Labour 
Council "hiring taxis to scuttle round a city handing out 
redundancy notices to its own workers."127
Liverpool had placed itself on a collision course with 
the government, over spending and rates, for a battle it was 
bound to lose. Kinnock knew this. With council employees 
fearing job losses, Kinnock saw the local leadership as 
vulnerable. In accusing the Militant leadership of not caring 
about the party's success but only about their own extreme 
ideology, he demonstrated strong leadership and led the party
126 Neil Kinnock to Labour Party Conference October 1st 
1985, The Guardian. October 2nd, 1985 p.6.
127 Liverpool Council, controlled by the Militant 
Tendency, had placed itself on a direct collision course with 
the Thatcher government's attempt to limit spending by local 
government. Rather than attempt to solve the city's financial 
crisis, the leadership chose to challenge the government by 
making redundant most of the city's employees. Ultimately the 
council was forced to back down, due to the determination of 
the government and the lack of support for the council' s 
methods.
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away from extreme and impractical policies. In November the 
NEC agreed to an investigation into the Liverpool party, which 
recommended bringing charges for breaches in party rules. In 
February 1986 the NEC suspended the Liverpool Constituency 
Labour Party (CLP) .128
Those on the hard left, but not part of the Militant 
Tendency, attacked the moves as a general attempt to discredit 
the left. In part it probably was. While legal challenges to 
the expulsions and other actions against Militant did follow, 
resulting in the creation of a new disciplinary system, and 
the National Constitutional Committee, a great blow against 
the Militant Tendency was struck. The challenge was in itself 
vital, but even more important, it was the key in signalling 
the beginning of the shift to the right. Kinnock realized
that if Labour was again to be a significant electoral force, 
modernization needed to come, not only in term of defeating 
the hard left but equally in terms of the party's image. The 
Militant threat may have been greatly reduced and the party 
set on a rightward path, but the public image of the party had 
to be reformed prior to the 1987 election.
Given the ridicule of Michael Foot in 1983129, strong
128 Eric Shaw, Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, chapter 9.
129 Throughout the campaign Foot was subject of attacks 
from the Tory press on his inadequacy as a prime-minister. 
His public standing in relation to the other party leaders 
left his as the first choice of only 13% as the best candidate 
for head of government.
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leadership was needed. Kinnock had increasingly provided 
this, but the fact that his personal standing in opinion polls 
remained significantly lower than the other major party 
leaders suggests that, in terms of public perception, it was 
in this area that he was least successful. The presentation 
of a far more professional image was also required. The 
demonstration of Kinnock's success in achieving this came in 
the 1987 election campaign, but from his election in 1983 he 
had made a priority of it. For example, during the 1984/5 
miner's strike Kinnock kept a continual distance from National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM) leader Arthur Scargill and refused 
to identify closely with his strategy, which at times involved 
law breaking. The NUM called for a future Labour government 
to reinstate sacked miners, review the cases of jailed miners, 
and reimburse fines. Kinnock refused to make such commitments. 
A new moderate image of the party leadership was being 
cultivated.
The 1987 Election Campaign.
The short-campaign run by Labour in the weeks prior to 
the June 1987 ballot was the most professional seen in the 
modern communications era. Each day of the campaign was 
carefully planned, with different sound bites and photo 
opportunities for each day. By the end of the campaign 
commentators universally proclaimed Labour's campaign the best 
of the three major parties, with it being professionally 
organized and run. Despite this, Labour suffered its second
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worse defeat ever. 1987 had been a triumph in terms of image 
but not in terms of substance.130 Policy changes since 1983 
had been minimal. Extreme elements such as withdrawal from 
the EEC, had vanished, but Labour's program offered little 
break from a traditional socialist approach. While the party 
had been reformed from within with the factional move to the 
right, no time had been left for a radical change in external 
policies. On defence and the economy Labour remained 
extremely vulnerable, with "Kinnock and his team knowing that, 
for all their pre-campaign effort, the edifice of the Labour 
Party had only really been redecorated, and moderately 
refurbished. "131
With another substantial electoral defeat in 1987 many on 
the hard left believed they could undermine the revisionist 
strategy. This proved not to be the case. Kinnock only 
strengthened his grip on the party. The conclusions reached 
from the 1987 defeat were that more reforms were required, not 
less. Hughes and Wintour write, "It was impossible for any 
remotely thoughtful party member to avoid concluding that the 
party had this time fallen down on policy.... Labour was out- 
of-date and out of line with people's most strongly felt 
aspirations."132 The result of the 1987 defeat was 
ultimately to re-energize the modernization process and allow
130 Hughes and Wintour,p. 3.
131 Ibid. , p. 28 .
132 Ibid. , p. 3.
sweeping policy changes.
CHAPTER VI 
External Reform, 1987-1992.
The period from 1983-1987 found the Labour Party 
reforming internal elements of its behavior, while externally 
presenting a new image. The beginning of the modernization 
process came about as a result of changing factional control 
within the party. The left of the party split, isolating the 
hard left which had previously been the driving force of 
policy through its strength at the constituency and conference 
levels. Up to 1987, the Kinnock leadership saw a moderation 
in the type of factional control, with the fresh alliance of 
soft left and right producing change. Policy reforms from 
1987 were of a far more extensive nature than anything 
witnessed in the earlier period. The agenda adopted moved the 
whole of the Labour Party considerably along the political 
spectrum. Long-term principles were dropped in the search for 
electoral success. The party appeared to be undertaking a 
classic Downsian approach.
This chapter seeks to explore the policy changes during 
this period, and explains just why they occurred. It reaches 
the conclusion that the leadership did not pursue a Downsian 
electoral strategy but largely responded to the already 
established Thatcherite agenda.
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Policy Reforms— Responding to the Thatcherite Agenda.
Labour's major policy review was instigated at the 1987 
party conference, following a third consecutive election 
defeat, with very little fanfare. Review groups were 
established, at the initiation of the leadership, to examine 
policy in areas such as industry, including public ownership, 
wealth creation, economic and social equality and public 
services.133 Enthusiasm amongst conference delegates was 
minimal, but after a third electoral defeat they were not 
going to be the ones to stop a new initiative before it had 
even begun, although they held out little hope of success.
In the months following the establishment of the review 
procedure, the Kinnock leadership appeared to lose much 
direction. Neil Kinnock personally doubted his ability to 
lead his party through an extended period of reform, while 
simultaneously facing a fresh assault from the left. Having 
completed four years in office, Kinnock realized that his 
party still had a mountain to climb before real hopes of 
electability returned. Following the crushing defeat of 1987, 
further setbacks were suffered in by-elections during 1988 
which left many questioning Kinnock's future as leader.
A direct challenge to his position was launched by hard 
left stalwart Tony Benn. Although he had little chance of 
success, a strong showing for the man who claimed Labour was
133Hughes and Wintour, p. 42
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suffering an identity crisis due to "the watering down of 
basic principles,"134 would have severely wounded the leader. 
Even more dangerous was the challenge by Benn's ally, John 
Prescott, for the position of deputy leader. Roy Hattersley 
had always symbolized the right-wing of the party and 
represented the new direction being undertaken. A defeat for 
him, feared as a real possibility, would have been a firm 
rebuke for any extensive policy reform.
These challenges from Benn and Prescott represented the 
renewed factional battles which occur following external 
defeat. However, in 1988 a further factional shift did not 
occur because Kinnock had improved Labour's showing in 1987, 
and also had established a strong alliance of support inside 
the party with his reforms from 1983-87.
Against Tony Benn, Kinnock collected 88% of the votes. 
The hard left no longer wielded major influence inside the 
party. Benn won only 18.8% of the constituency vote, formerly 
the left's stronghold, producing a humiliating defeat which 
only strengthened Kinnock.135 Similarly, Roy Hattersley 
solidly defeated his main challenger136 with a 66.8% to 23.7% 
victory. Hattersley collected over 60% of the constituency 
vote. The leadership duo were given a vote of confidence from
134 Tony Benn, reported in Hughes and Wintour, p. 79.
135 Hughes and Wintour, p.86.
136 A third candidate, Eric Heffer, also entered the 
deputy contest but was able to garner only 9% of the ballot.
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all levels of the party.
With this renewed level of authority, the way had been 
cleared for pressing ahead with the policy review. A much 
tighter policy-making system was now in existence, with a 
shadow-cabinet/NEC alliance dominating the process, rather 
than haphazard efforts from conference. Groups were 
established for reviewing policy areas, each handpicked by 
Kinnock. These were designed to produced the outcome he 
desired, while simultaneously allowing voices of dissent to be 
heard, enhancing unity.137
The culmination of these efforts came in the publication 
of "Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, First report of 
Labour's Policy Review for the 1990s." This comprised reports 
from seven review groups, reports which were to act as the 
launching pad for the new party policies in the early 1990s. 
The publication saw the party's first acceptance of the 
importance of the market, so vital to the philosophy of Mrs. 
Thatcher. It explained how the market was able to bring, 
"competition, stimulate innovation and widen consumer 
choice."138 Such language had never been seen in socialist 
publications of the past. With the market being so prominent 
in Conservative ideology, Labour was clearly responding to the 
direction undertaken by the government, rather than plotting
137 Ibid.
138 The Labour Party, Social Justice and Economic 
Efficiency. London: Labour Party, 1988, p.4.
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its own path. In the area of social ownership the same 
pattern was found. The document provided the root for future 
change as it conceded that government ownership was 
appropriate only in certain circumstances. Likewise, with 
regard to the European Community the language was very 
different from the past. Gone was the commitment to withdraw, 
and while the document remained skeptical about agricultural 
policy and the single market, the battle with Europe was now 
from within the Community.
This document provided only the basis on which future 
substantial changes were built. Its importance, though, is 
great as it signalled the new policy direction to be 
undertaken. The direction was to the right in search of 
electoral success, with a shadowing of Conservative 
philosophy.
Having achieved this start, Kinnock was now free to 
embark on a fresh stage of reforms in 1989. To appreciate 
these changes, and the influence of the Conservatives, three 
key policy areas are now examined. Labour's policy on 
taxation, nationalization and industrial strategy and defence 
all metamorphosized under Neil Kinnock.
Policy Reform 1989-1992— Taxation.
Democratic socialism developed during the post-war period 
operating on the principle of redistribution of income. 
Through a progressive tax system the income and wealth of the 
better off in society would be redirected by government in
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support of the poor. The tax policy operated by the last 
Labour government reflected such a belief with a top income 
tax bracket of 83%, as well as no limits on national 
insurance.
It was this tax policy that the Conservatives attacked in 
the 1979 election. The policy was stifling all incentives for 
the wealthiest in society to work. If this sector of the 
workforce did not work, so the Conservatives claimed, then 
jobs and prosperity would not be created further down the 
financial ladder. Tax rates in Britain were also penalizing 
middle and working class groups, as a base rate of 33% stifled 
consumer spending. From the outset Mrs.Thatcher pledged to 
cut taxation.
In reality the Thatcher and Lawson tax cutting program 
was never as great as promised. While income tax levels were 
drastically cut, leaving only a two-tier system of 25 and 40%, 
indirect regressive taxes were increased. However, with this 
definite shift away from personal, direct taxation, from 
taxing income to taxing consumption, a new agenda had been 
set. The penal levels of income tax espoused by Labour until 
1987 were no longer electorally acceptable. This was made 
painfully clear to Labour during the 1987 election campaign as 
Neil Kinnock disclosed that those earning over £15,000 p.a. 
would be worse off when Tory tax cuts were reversed.139 
Given this concession the Conservatives were able to launch a
139 See The Times. June 5th, 1987, p.l.
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savage attack as Chancellor Lawson claimed 22 million people 
would be worse off under Labour's tax proposals.140 The 
Prime Minister claimed Labour's spending plans would need a 
basic rate of income tax at 54% or VAT (value added tax) at 
50%.
Such claims were undoubtedly exaggerated but the mud did 
stick. Labour's history had tarred them with a brush of high 
taxation. The leadership knew this shackle must be broken but 
faced a conundrum. As Hughes and Wintour put it, they "had to 
frame a tax policy for Labour which would achieve the party's 
redistributive aims, while assuaging voters fears that Labour 
would place both the national economy and their own families 
in tax servitude.1,143
The challenge to Labour was to find a balance. Such an 
attempt was first produced in May 1989 after a sweeping NEC 
policy review. Although Labour promised to return to the 
progressive principle so greatly undermined by the Thatcher 
governments, in announcing a 50% ceiling on income tax they 
vowed not to, "return to the high and marginal rates of tax 
which occurred in the past."144 Simultaneously, though, 
Labour pledged to abolish limits on national insurance 
contributions, which effectively meant a further 9% on the top 
tax band.
140 Ibid.
143 Hughes and Wintour,p. 139 .
144 See The Guardianr May 8th, 1989, p. 2.
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This policy remained through to the 1992 election. For 
Labour it always proved to be a balancing act— respond to the 
Thatcherite agenda of tax cuts or remaining loyal to 
redistributive and spending principles. In comparison to the 
1987 pledges of substantially increasing income tax and 
introducing a wealth tax, the policy of 1992 was a radical 
change.
Nationalization and Industrial Strategy.
Analysts identify the Labour government of 1945-1951 as 
the party's most successful ever. Dominant in this government 
was the period 1945 to 1948 when the party introduced radical, 
long-term changes to the British economy. A wide-ranging 
program of nationalization was embarked upon, witnessing 
government purchase of industries such as coal, rail, and 
later iron and steel. From this time on many of Labour's 
economic proposals centered on the extension of government 
control as a means of economic growth and wealth 
redistribution.
These principles were attacked by the Thatcher-led 
Conservative Party. Its new economic agenda of the 1980s saw 
the market as the central element. A privatization program 
was embarked upon which saw the sale of industries such as 
British Telecom, British Airways, the water industry, the 
Central Electricity Generating Board and British Gas. The 
period of extensive government ownership was over.
In 1983 Labour was fully committed to renationalization,
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and a further extension of government control. Although the 
party's 1987 manifesto did not detail a massive 
nationalization program, Kinnock openly admitted that he saw 
a long-term extension of social ownership once the economic 
climate allowed. During the election campaign he explained 
that in the manifesto he had set out, "to lower his 
sights...because of the parlous state of the economy and 
public services...[However] it is necessary to get the 
participation on behalf of the people by the government in the 
organization, ownership and control of industry."145
The party was remaining loyal to its economic principles, 
but the Thatcher agenda demanded attention to the concerns of 
small business and the freedom of the market. Labour's policy 
reforms since 1989 have reflected this. The party set out its 
industrial strategy in the 1991 publication 'Opportunity 
Britain.1 It explained how, "government must work in 
partnership with industry to modernize the British economy. 
The old ideologies— command economy at the one extreme, crude 
free market economies at the other— have no credibility."146 
Labour's proposal was for cooperation with industry, not 
control, and two-way consultation, not three-way including the 
trade unions. Later in the year the policy document 'Modern 
manufacturing strength,' saw the party commit itself to
145 Neil Kinnock, reported in The Times. June 2nd, 1987,
p. 1.
146 The Labour Party, Opportunity Britain. Labour's better 
wav for the 1990s. London: Labour Party, 1991, p.4.
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capitalist style policies with promises of corporate tax 
allowances for investment and the possibility of individuals 
being able to set investment in business against taxation.147
The policy reforms meant that the party no longer saw an 
important role for government in owning and controlling 
industry. Private investment and profit would be encouraged 
with modern government having a "role, not to replace the 
market but to ensure that the market works properly."148 
Defence.
Since the late 1950s the party had fought internal 
battles over the direction of defence policy— unilateral or 
multilateral? With the left securing control of the party in 
the early 1980s a strongly unilateral stance was taken.
Unfortunately for Labour this was done at a time when the 
Thatcher government had placed defence policy at the center of 
British politics. The Falklands war had combined with the 
'new1 cold war to make defence a key issue at the 1983 ballot. 
The then defence secretary, Michael Heseltine, launched his 
party's campaign with claims that Labour's policy of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament would alienate the United 
States, tip the balance of power to the USSR and, "thus 
dangerously raise the risk that the Soviet Union might be
147 See The Labour Party, Modern manufacturing strength. 
London: Labour Party, 1991, p.7.
148 The Labour Party, It's time to get Britain working 
again. London: Labour Party, 1992, p.11.
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tempted towards the military adventurism in Europe that NATO 
stopped in the 1940s."149
Throughout the campaign the Conservatives attacked Labour 
for what Mrs.Thatcher called a policy that was "desperately 
and dangerously wrong."150 Although international tensions 
had decreased by 1987, the weakness of Labour's policy 
remained. Only 28% of the electorate supported Labour's 
stance and under half of the party's own identifiers favored 
the position.151
The strong Conservative stance on defence, insisting on 
the maintenance of a full nuclear deterrent and a leading role 
in the NATO alliance, had contrasted to such an extent with 
Labour's policy as to leave them in an impossible position. 
Once again Labour responded with an end to the commitment of 
unilateralism in May 1989. Neil Kinnock explained that 
unilateralism was "not even comprehended by those who share 
our objectives in other countries. They cannot understand our 
position of conceding nuclear weapons without getting anything 
in return."152
149 Michael Heseltine, reported in The Guardian. May 13th, 
1983, p.2.
150 Mrs. Thatcher, reported The Guardian. May 27th, 1987,
p.l.
151 Figures from Miller et al. How voters change. The 1987 
British General Election campaign in perspective. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990, pp.51-54.
152 Neil Kinnock, reported in The Guardian. May 10th, 
1989, p.8.
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Downsian policy reform?
Examination of these three policy areas demonstrates that 
the new policies developed by the Labour Party were a 
reflection of the Thatcherite agenda. It would be wrong to 
conclude, however, that these policy reforms represented a 
Downsian approach. Labour developed policies to mimic the 
Conservative success, not find the consensus center of British 
politics. The Conservatives policies under Mrs. Thatcher 
never sought to find the political consensus. As Crewe and 
Searing explain, "Mrs. Thatcher won despite the unpopularity 
of her own ideology."153
In 1987 support for Thatcherite policy positions was 
minimal. Only 13% supported more tax cuts rather than 
increased social services, 14% believed price control should 
take priority over job creation and 25% accepted the 
"illegitimacy of the trade unions."154
If BES cross sectional surveys on the electorate's 
attitude to key policy areas are also considered, little 
change can be identified during the 198 0s.155 For example, 
the percentage agreeing that the government should 
redistribute income in favor of the less well-off fluctuated 
only from 54% in October 1974 to 50% in 1987. The percentage 
believing the government should spend more to defeat poverty
153 Crewe and Searing, p. 378.
154 Figures from Crewe and Searing, p. 376.
155 Heath, et al. p. 175.
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rose from 84% to 86% over the same period, while between 1979 
and 1987 those believing that more money should be put in to 
the National Health Service (NHS) increased from 87 to 90%. 
Over this same period those believing the government should 
privatize some state held companies, a central Thatcherite 
economic policy, fell from 38% to 31%. Data continue to 
suggest little evidence of the electorate moving right to any 
great extent since 1974 or 1979.
Mrs. Thatcher's position was clearly not at the political 
center, but it was these policy positions that Labour's 
reforms followed. In a conclusion that clearly reflects 
Labour's actions, Crewe and Searing write, "Politicians are 
most likely to adjust their ideologies to appeal to 
electorates...when the victorious opponents ideology is 
thought to be popular."156
The policy reforms undertaken by Labour since 1987 have 
placed the party further right than ever before. This is not 
because the party has been searching for center ground, but 
because it was responding to a successful Thatcherite 
electoral stance.
During this period Labour carried out policy reform to an 
unprecedented level. Never before had a party in Britain 
carried out such a comprehensive change in policy direction. 
The reasons for these changes were three-fold. First, the 
left had gradually lost influence within the party since the
156 Crewe and Searing, p. 378.
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general election humiliation of 1983. This was ultimately 
confirmed by the challenges to Kinnock and Hattersley in 1988, 
which demonstrated the lack of support for the left at all 
levels of the party. Second, the factional change which 
accompanied the decline meant a corresponding rise in policies 
looking in a moderate direction. Finally, and most 
significantly, was the desire of the leadership and the party 
for a return to power. Once the leadership had survived 
factional challenges following the 1987 defeat, policy reforms 
were introduced shadowing the Conservative policy direction. 
In electoral terms Mrs.Thatcher was the most successful Tory 
leader of the 20th century. In an attempt to defeat her, the 
Labour leadership sacrificed their own principles to her 
policy agenda.
CHAPTER VII 
1992— READY FOR GOVERNMENT?
The final episode in the story of the successful reform 
and modernization of the Labour party, should tell the tale of 
a return to power. The election of April 1992 shattered the 
hopes of a fairy-tale ending when the Conservatives won a 
shock fourth consecutive term. Neil Kinnock had been 
successful in reforming his party internally, but externally 
it still faced up to substantial defeat at the ballot box.
This chapter explores events prior to the vote, all of 
which appeared to indicate a Kinnock premiership. It asks why 
did Labour only improve their performance to the extent that 
it still ranked as their third worst in the modern era. The 
Conservatives were in a far weaker position than at any 
previous election, and so this defeat for Labour threatened to 
be more damaging than any of the previous three. Had the 
modernization process all been in vain?
The Conservative Government 1987-1992.
A brief consideration of the previous five years of Tory 
government finds a party ripe for removal from office. Their 
triumph in the 1987 election was followed by more of the 
Lawson boom. Consumer spending continued at record levels, 
but severe economic miscalculations had been made at the 
central level. With the economy fuelled up for the election
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success of 1987, after the election it was time to 'take the 
steam out' or slow down the economy. A continuation at such 
a high level of consumer extravagance would only store up 
rapid inflation for the future. The government misread the 
state of the economy, choosing to inject money into the 
economy following the stock market crash of October 1987. 
This only fuelled up the real economy to a greater extent. 
Consumer spending was further encouraged by the Chancellor's 
policy of shadowing the Deutsche Mark, which required the 
maintenance of low British interest rates. More tax cuts in
1988 created greater enjoyment of the short-term boom, but by
1989 the economic consequences were being felt.
During 1989 the surge of inflation to levels over 9%, was 
accompanied by hikes in interest rates to attempt to control 
the rise. The reduction of inflation was sought at all costs. 
These costs proved to be severely damaging to consumer 
confidence, the housing market, and the manufacturing sector. 
The high interest rates, peaking at a level of 15% but 
remaining consistently over 10% from 1989 through 1992, 
rendered spending and investment impossible. Britain was left 
in its longest post-war recession.
While economic issues were always present in the thoughts 
of Conservative backbench MPs as they watched the slide in 
support for their party in opinion polls, it was two other 
issues which pushed them into removing Mrs.Thatcher as party 
leader and prime-minister. First came the Community Charge,
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or Poll Tax, as it became commonly known. This was a Thatcher 
brain-child designed to introduce greater accountability at 
the local government level. Each citizen over the age of 18 
would be responsible for paying the charge, in some cases at 
levels over £600 a year.157 Huge numbers of people faced 
bills far higher than they previously paid under the rating 
system.158 The fact that the Poll Tax was a flat rate charge 
meant it had a highly regressive impact.
The goal of the new tax had been to make left-wing local 
councils more accountable for their high levels of spending. 
When the local electorates realized the high charges they 
faced, the high spending councils would be held directly 
responsible in local elections. The actual impact was to 
create a level a of hostility towards the government, and 
towards Mrs. Thatcher especially, of unprecedented intensity. 
The Poll Tax crisis, combined with the effect of growing 
recession and the resignation of Nigel Lawson as 
Chancellor159 to cause a plunge in support for the
157 Certain reductions were available to groups on income 
support or students but all were responsible for at least some 
payment.
158 Under the rating system contributions to local 
authority income were paid according to the level of income a 
house would earn if rented out. Only the head of the 
household was responsible for payment.
159 In the fall of 1989 Nigel Lawson resigned from the 
cabinet following a public dispute with Mrs.Thatcher over the 
direction of economic policy. In November of that year she 
faced the first ever challenge to her position as leader from 
backbench MP Sir Anthony Meyer. While having no hope of 
victory Meyer was representative of growing unrest within the
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government. By Spring 1990 the Conservatives were 25% behind 
Labour in the opinion polls.160
It was during 1990 that the second issue dividing the 
party, and curtailing Mrs.Thatcher1s support, emerged. As 
prime-minister she had always been skeptical about closer 
political union through the European Community, but towards 
the end of 1990 she became increasingly aggressive and rude in 
public to her European counterparts.161 The consequence of 
her stance was to provoke the resignation of Sir Geoffrey Howe 
as the Deputy Prime Minister. He viciously attacked the Prime 
Minister, claiming she was dividing the party and destroying 
any future electoral hopes. With the party in disarray, 
former defense secretary Michael Heseltine challenged 
Mrs.Thatcher for the party leadership. The final result was 
her removal from the position of leader and her replacement by 
the then chancellor, John Major.
The growth of Mrs.Thatcher1s personal unpopularity, and 
the dominance of Labour in the opinion polls, had forced her 
from office. Had the Conservatives chosen to continue with
party.
160 See Gallup poll for The Daily Telegraph. April 6th, 
1990, p.l.
161 At the Rome Conference of EC heads of government in 
October 1990, she told the other eleven leaders that they were 
living in "cloud cuckoo land" as plans for further union were 
discussed. More significant than what Mrs.Thatcher said was 
the abrasive manner she adopted, turning herself into a figure 
of ridicule across Europe. See The Times. October 10th, 1990, 
p.l.
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their leader of 15 years, Labour appeared guaranteed a return 
to office. As it was, the new prime-minister provided a 
bounce for the government in the opinion polls. A new policy 
direction was undertaken, with most significantly the poll tax 
being scratched.
Although the Conservatives held a narrow lead in opinion 
polls during the early months of 1991, the state of the 
economy prevented the prime-minister from calling an election. 
Unemployment continued to rise to levels approaching 3 
million, while interest rates continued to curtail industrial 
investment and consumer spending. By the summer of 1991 
Labour had resecured its consistent lead in polls. In the 
months leading to the April 1992 ballot, Labour had a steady 
4 point lead over the government.162 All indicators 
suggested, at worst, that Labour would become the largest 
party in a hung parliament. While the complete overturn of 
the huge Conservative parliamentary majority in one effort was 
always a daunting prospect, the continual disarray in the 
party which had been present since 1990 gave Labour real hope.
Labour should indeed have had real hope. Having been in 
power for thirteen years, the Conservatives went to the 
country with the economy still in deep recession, following a 
government of continual confusion. With such a situation the 
main opposition party should have been ready to replace them.
162 Figures from The Sunday Times poll of polls, April
12th, 1992.
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Labour should have won the 1992 general election. They did 
not.
Examining Labour's Defeat.
More fortuitous circumstances for Labour could not have 
been imagined than those enjoyed at the time of the 1992 vote. 
However, the electorate rejected Neil Kinnock's "new party" in 
a manner similar to its left-wing predecessors. Labour 
collected only 35.2% of the popular vote, an increase of 4 
points over 1987 but hugely disappointing for the party. John 
Major's Conservatives were returned to office with over 14 
million votes, a 42.8%, share and a 21 seat majority over all 
other parties. The Tories secured an emphatic 336 to 271 seat 
victory over Labour, comfortably leaving them as the largest 
party in the Commons.
Has Labour a future in its present form, now that its 
reformed version has been whole-heartedly rejected? Although 
they did manage a further increase in their share of the vote, 
they have still to return to their 1979 level of 37% let alone 
their 1970 level of 40.2%. In the midst of a recession and 
with a campaign universally regarded as badly organized, the 
Conservatives won a fourth successive term, the first such 
victory since 1827. As one commentator explained, "If you 
examine Labour's share of the poll since 1945, it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that we are witnessing a remorseless 
decline in the Labour vote, with 1992 marking but a blip when
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circumstances were particularly favourable.1,163 Some of 
Labour's leading figures, most notably the then deputy leader, 
Roy Hattertsley, argued that in the depth of recession the 
electorate were frightened of change, preferring the devil 
they knew. Such a claim, that the electorate is more selfish 
at a time of recession, and therefore avoids a possibly 
redistributive government, fails to ring true. In 1987 Labour 
explained away the size of its defeat by claiming that the 
Lawson boom had won the Conservatives votes. This was true. 
To claim now that the Lamont recession aided the government is 
absurd. The Clinton Democratic victory in the 1992 American 
Presidential race demonstrated that when the electorate judges 
that a better alternative exists it will remove an incumbent. 
The explanations of Labour's defeat go far deeper than this.
If Labour is to have a long-term future it must first 
examine the immediate reasons for its defeat and then consider 
its long-term direction. In 4 years time, or whenever the 
next general election is called, Labour will face the added 
problem of reapportionment. The Boundary Commission changes 
will provide the Conservatives with at least an additional 10, 
and as many as 20, new seats in the south of England.164 A
163 See Martin Jaques in The Sunday Times. April 19th 
1992, p.5. Jaques is the former editor of Marxism Today.
164 The Boundary Commission is responsible for the 
redrawing of electoral boundaries in Britain according to 
population shifts. With the growth in population in the 
Conservative stronghold south, seats are likely to be 
reapportioned to these areas. Labour are the likely losers of 
reapportionment with the decline in population in industrial
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Labour victory under the current voting system will require a 
greater swing to the left at the next election than occurred 
in 1992 due to the boundary changes.165 To achieve this the 
party must begin by correcting the faults of 1992.
Neil Kinnock.
Blake Morrison writes of Kinnock, "Perhaps his 
achievements in reforming the party made him a John the 
Baptist or Gorbachev figure, preparing the way for others, 
rather than as a prime-minister."166 Without ever leading 
his party into office, Neil Kinnock*s term of leadership must 
be regarded as one of the most successful ever. He has 
created a new party within the party's original structure. 
The policy reforms of 1987 to 1992 made Labour a true 
alternative.
However, Kinnock may have been partly responsible for the 
defeat. His public image was never one of prime-ministerial 
material. Constantly attacked by the Tory press as a 'wind 
bag', he struggled with a personal credibility problem. This 
was then compounded by Labour strategists who chose to run a 
campaign in the US Presidential style. Kinnock was central to 
the campaign, which may only have enhanced public suspicions 
of him. Over-confidence was continually in existence,
areas, Labour strongholds.
165 See The Guardian. April 11th, 1992, p. 3.
166 Blake Morrison The Independent. April 12th, 1992,
p.17.
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reaching a pinnacle at the Sheffield rally in the final days 
of the campaign. Kim Howells, the Labour MP for Pontypidd 
explains, "This absurd triumphalism and pompous music, all 
this glitz got in the way. Not only were we counting chickens 
before they were hatched, we were acting as if we were the 
government already."167 The Kinnocks were presented as if 
living in Downing Street already, when Labour needed to be 
emphasizing a competent team for government.
Miscalculations were also made during the campaign in 
relation to policy emphasis. Rather than making a total 
attack on the Conservatives1 mishandling of the economy and 
fully exploiting this weakness, Labour concentrated on issues 
on which they felt strong. The state of the national health 
service and the quality of state education were both central 
to the Labour platform. They were, indeed, areas in which 
Labour was strong, but were not issues by which they were 
likely to gain additional support. Voters determining their 
selection on the health or education issue were already likely 
to have selected Labour. Further to this, issues such as the 
national health service might only to be salient with those 
directly affected. The vast majority of the electorate may 
not consider the state of the service until they are actually 
ill. Of far more concern to the bulk of the country is the 
state of the economy and their own personal finances.
167 See Kim Howells The Guardian. April 13th, 1992, p.3.
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Public fear and Labour's past
Although Kinnock had been successful in modernizing the 
party, Martin Jaques writes, "the Great Reformer himself was 
inextricably tied to the past...his body language and rhetoric 
a constant reminder of a bygone era, that of the south Wales 
valleys and the mining communities."168 The electorate still 
distrusts a Labour government, due to the party's socialist 
past. During the campaign the Conservatives continually 
produced negative images of what Labour in power would mean. 
High levels of taxation, high levels of inflation, and a 
return to union power were all threatened. Memories of the 
1974-79 government and the "Winter of Discontent" were again 
resurrected. While the images were overtly negative, they 
were sufficient to cast doubts in the mind of the electorate.
To counteract such challenges in the future, the 
modernized Labour party needs to openly distance itself from 
the past. A repudiation of the last Labour government is now 
needed from a leadership team that holds almost no association 
with it. To break from the past Labour must do more than 
change. It must directly state to the electorate that it has 
indeed changed. Half-hearted defenses of past Labour policy 
and actions must end, so preventing the current party being 
savaged by the Conservatives for days long gone.
Labour also suffered from its long established ties with
168 See Martin Jaques The Sunday Times. April 19th, 1992,
p. 5.
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the unions. The block vote the unions wield at party 
conference and in selection of the party leader enhance the 
image of Labour as the party of the unions. The Conservatives 
again played upon public fears, claiming that a return of 
Labour to power would mean a return of the union stranglehold 
on the British economy.
The Press
Immediately following the election result, Neil Kinnock 
publicly lambasted the Tory press for greatly enhancing his 
party's prospects of defeat. The Whitty report,169 the 
party's own investigation into its defeat, also stressed the 
significance of press attacks. Such criticisms are indeed 
valid. Throughout the final campaign the bulk of the popular 
press actively supported the Conservatives. In the final days 
savage attacks were launched. On polling day, April 9th, The 
Sun's front page was covered by the statement "Will the last 
person to leave Britain please turn out the lights,"170 
should Labour win. This was followed by attacks upon both 
Kinnock and Labour throughout the edition. Similarly, The 
Daily Mail's banner headline was simply 'Warning.,171 The 
Paper then proceeded to warn that if Labour were elected a 
sterling crisis would follow within days, accompanied by
169 This investigation was chaired by party general 
secretary Larry Whitty and published in June of 1992.
170 See The Sun. April 9th, 1992, p.l.
171 See The Daily Mail. April 9th, 1992, p.l.
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higher interest rates. The combined circulation of these two 
tabloids is six million.
Criticism of the press coverage may be valid, but the 
press must be seen as only a minor contributing factor. There 
attacks were no different from attacks on previous Labour 
leaders. Their impact comes into question as the majority 
garner their information from the largely impartial television 
news coverage. Similarly, those reading the Tory tabloids 
probably are Conservative supporters to begin with.
Labour's Tax Proposals.
Even when competing against a party which had lost its 
reputation for economic competence, it was Labour which was 
placed on the defensive in the final stages of the campaign. 
The tax proposals of the party had been published by Shadow 
Chancellor John Smith, soon after the election was called. 
Labour was proposing a top income tax bracket of 50%, a 10% 
increase. Additionally, and possibly fatally, it planned to 
remove the ceiling on National Insurance Contributions. This 
effectively meant a highest tax band of 59%.
Although Labour's proposals were in no way as punitive as 
previous plans, the Conservatives attacked them as traditional 
high tax socialist policies. Fear again played a significant 
role, especially in the South where Labour had to make strong 
gains. As one Labour MP explains, "We never really addressed 
southern England and other wealthy parts of the country. The 
assumption that somehow our tax policy would be accepted by
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large numbers of people in these areas was always very
questionable.11172
Labour had argued that only those with incomes over 
£21,000 p.a. would be affected. While this level is well 
above the average income, many of the middle-class voters 
whose support Labour needed for victory aspired to such
levels. Conservative style values and hopes for the future 
had not changed, even in a recession. As shadow cabinet 
member Brian Gould argued, "There is no doubt that our tax 
proposals appeared to set a cap on people's aspiration, 
particularly in the south of England, where we need especially 
to attract support."173 Pocket-book decisions had combined 
with general economic expectations to severely weaken Labour 
in an area where they had to make substantial ground.174
Labour is left facing a conundrum over future tax policy. 
If it is to finance spending programs taxes will have to be
raised, but for the party to be elected an electorate which
will have enjoyed over 15 years of lower personal tax rates 
will have to be won over.
When tax policy is combined with the fear associated with 
the Labour past, the lack of Neil Kinnock's personal appeal,
172 Kim Howells in The Guardian. April 13th, 1992, p.3.
173 Brain Gould, then shadow environment spokesman, 
writing in The Sunday Times. April 19th, 1992, p.4.
174 See David Sanders, "Why the Conservative Party Won- 
Again." A. King (ed) , Britain at the Polls 1992. New York: 
Chatham House, 1993.
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and the failings in Labour's campaign strategy, explanations 
for the party's defeat can be found. They are indeed failings 
which can be corrected by the party in its present form. If 
they are to be corrected the only way is for the party to 
continue down the path Kinnock began.
Events following the election do suggest this is the 
direction the party had undertaken. Under the Dual Advisory 
Theory, a danger existed that internal battles could 
resurface. With the right-led party again defeated, the left 
might have rallied support for a return to traditional 
socialist values. Such calls were largely muted, however. 
Left-wing stalwarts, such as Ken Livingstone and Bernie Grant, 
did claim that Labour had failed because the alternative 
offered had not been sufficiently left-wing.175 The 
majority, though, even on the left supported a continuation of 
the Kinnock direction. Traditionally left-wing MP Austin 
Mitchell, of Greater Grimsby, illustrated this as he called 
for a policy of "steady as she goes"176 When the right-wing 
candidate, John Smith, secured a landslide victory in the 
party's June leadership ballot it appeared that this was 
exactly what the party had done.177
175 See The Independent. April 12th, 1992, p.17.
176 See Austin Mitchell The Guardian. April 11th, 1992, 
p.3 where he issued his call for the party to continue in the 
direction Kinnock had begun.
177 In the June ballot John Smith collected just over 91% 
of the party's votes, with Brian Gould collecting only 8%. In 
the deputy leadership contest, Margaret Beckett was triumphant
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The reason why the right-wing faction has survived even 
after a second defeat is that the party has once again 
improved its position. The memories of 1983 are still fresh 
enough to prevent a resurging left. The controlling right- 
wing of the party is still regarded as the most likely to 
succeed. The feeling amongst the majority of the party is 
that if the failings of the 1992 campaign are corrected, the 
personally popular John Smith can lead the party further down 
the path Neil Kinnock set out, and possibly to success in 1996 
or 1997. As the Conservative Party continues to govern in 
disarray,178 many in the Labour Party believe that more 
reforms could produce the one final push to return them to 
power.
with 57.3% of the votes. John Prescott collected 28.2% and 
Brian Gould 14.5%.
178 From the time of their reelection the Conservative 
government has lurched from one crisis to another. The 
economy has stubbornly remained in deep recession, Britain has 
been forced to withdraw from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of 
the EC, the government has made a U-turn of proposed pit 
closures in the face of huge public pressure and the prime- 
minister threatened to resign over a possible to failure to 
ratify the Maastricht treaty on further European Union. John 
Major has replaced his predecessor as the most unpopular 
prime-minister since polling began, and his ability to lead 
the government has been severely questioned.
CHAPTER VIII 
LABOUR'S FUTURE
To ensure a return to government the Labour Party must 
make further changes, both within its internal structure and 
at its external policy level. In concluding the previous 
chapter it was suggested that these changes may well be within 
the reach of the party. One more push from the 1992 result 
and the Conservatives could be removed from office. Labour 
appear to be on the right track— steadily reversing the 
Conservative majority from the disaster of 1983. But are 
they? Is the truth actually, as Andrew Neil writes that 
those, "who argue that Labour can win with just one more push 
are whistling in the wind? The harsh fact for Labour is that 
the general election of 1992 was a low point for the 
Tories.I|179
This chapter seeks to explore the long-term future of the 
Labour Party in British politics, asking whether the political 
obstacles facing Labour are higher than those suggested after 
the 1992 election defeat. Are the changes required far 
greater than the cosmetic alterations previously suggested?
179 See editorial of Andrew Neil in The Sunday Times. 
April 19th 1992 p.3. An almost identical editorial appeared 
on page 17 of The Independent on June 16th 1992. It stated, 
"To suggest that one more heave will suffice to shove Labour 
back into power in 1996 or 1997, after four successive 
defeats, is deeply unconvincing."
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The key issue which Labour must come to terms with, if 
the party is ever to return to power in its present form, is 
the size of the Conservative victory in 1992. At a time of 
nationwide economic recession, as opposed to being regionally 
concentrated, the Conservatives were returned with a 
comfortable majority in the Commons and a substantial nine 
point margin over Labour in popular terms.180 In the South 
of the country (except London) , where Labour must break the 
almost absolute Tory grip on seats to win a national election, 
Conservative support was even greater. In the South East they 
won a popular vote victory over Labour of 54.5% to 20.7%, and 
in the South West of 47.6% to 31.4%. By the time of the next 
election, the Boundary Commission's work will have ensured 
that these popular majorities translate into an even greater 
number of seats. These regions remained loyal Tory blue, even 
at a time of hardship. For them a bad Conservative government 
offered more hope than a reformed Labour one.
The Conservatives seem to have an unshakable grip on at 
least two-fifths of the electorate.181 The remainder is then 
split between a divided opposition. To break this Tory hold, 
Labour must enter a further period of metamorphosis.
180 Although the Conservatives were returned to power in 
1983 with much of the country facing economic hardship, the 
South and South East, areas which provide the core Tory 
support, never suffered to the same intensity. In the 
recession of 1992 it was these regions which were hit the very 
hardest.
181 See David Marquand, The Guardian. April 11th, 1992,
p. 2.
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Tax, the campaign, the press, the leader and past fears 
and prejudices have all been cited as reasons for Labour's 
latest failures. Martin Jaques concedes "Of course, these 
were all factors, but any Labour politician who believes these 
are the real reasons is engaged in an act of gross self 
delusion."182 The Cl and C2 voters in the South of England 
were not swayed by last minute campaign failings. They have 
become long-term Tory voters, in the way industrial areas used 
to guarantee Labour a 4 0% share of the vote. In 1992 
conditions for Labour could not have been more advantageous, 
but they still failed. Their third worst electoral 
performance since 19 31 must be seen as failure.
As Martin Jaques explains, "If you examine Labour's share 
of the poll since 1945, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that we are witnessing a remorseless decline in the 
Labour vote, with 1992 marking a blip when circumstances were 
peculiarly favorable."183 Although the party is continuing 
down the Kinnock path, it is doing so without any great 
urgency. Many are acting under the belief that cosmetic 
policy changes and a charismatic leader will be enough. This 
may not be the case. To win over the desperately needed 
voters in the south of England, Labour needs to reinvent 
itself to a similar extent as occurred under the Kinnock
182 Martin Jaques, The Sunday Times. April 19th, 1992,
p. 5.
183 Ibid.
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leadership. In 1992 Labour did perforin well, but still lost. 
Serious reexamination of the party's basic principles is 
needed.
The Labour Party was born out of industrialization and an 
expanding working class. It was built on the belief that the 
masses were located at the bottom of the economic pyramid and 
the wealthy at the top. The party has failed to appreciate 
that in the information age of the 1990s, British society is 
more egg than pyramid shaped.184 While Labour has accepted 
the need to expand its support beyond a working-class base, 
the party has little real substance to offer in alternative to 
the Conservatives. The core of its policy agenda in 1992 was 
social and redistributive issues, such as the health service 
and income support. While these are valid issues, the party 
failed to comprehensively address the issue of wealth creation 
which is vital if such plans are to be financed.
In seeking to create a distance from its roots, the party 
has moved away from its traditional socialist ideology. 
Attempts were made to compete with the Tories, as Labour moved 
across the ideological spectrum in a seemingly Downsian 
fashion. Labour's motion was unquestionably towards the 
political center, but it was not, however, driven by a 
Downsian strategy. Moving the party were changes in factional 
control and the Kinnock leadership being forced to respond to 
the agenda dictated by the Thatcher governments. Consequently
184 Ibid.
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Labour has been left in limbo. It has abandoned its own 
ideology in the search for success, but not replaced it. As 
Peter Kellner explains the only available ideology in modern 
society is capitalism.185 Only when Labour fully embraces 
this can the party hope to run a government creating enough 
wealth to finance its social programs. Until now the 
leadership has failed to do this, being "too scared of [the 
party's] past to say boldly what is good about modern 
capitalism - and too scared of its opponents' orthodoxies to 
say boldly what is bad."186 Labour must develop policies 
specifically aimed at the creation of wealth in the private 
sector, while using central government to gently fix the 
failings of the system. In shadowing the Thatcherite agenda 
Kinnock began the process, but the party still has further to 
travel.
If Labour is to achieve this it must begin by abandoning 
its Clause Four commitment to public ownership. Although the 
party now pledges little expansion of public ownership, the 
removal of the clause from the party constitution is vital to 
signify the new direction the party is undertaking. With this 
as a beginning, the Labour Party must become a 'post­
socialist'187 party, offering a radical new 'center'
185 See Peter Kellner in The Independent. July 19th, 1992,
p. 3 .
186 Ibid.
187 See Martin Jacques The Sunday Times. April 19th 1992
p. 5.
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alternative to the Tories.
To return to power these are the conclusions the party 
may be forced to draw from the defeat of 1992. The likelihood 
is, however, that any such conclusions will not be drawn until 
after the next general election. With the quick selection of 
John Smith as the new leader, without a real post mortem, the 
party has signalled its intention to continue a Kinnock style 
battle. Smith will bring changes. At the party's Fall 1992 
conference the voting block of the unions was cut from 90 to 
70%. Plans are in existence to further reduce this. Policies 
will continue to change too, but not to a radical extent. 
Demonstrating this, on being elected leader Smith proclaimed 
that the party would embark, "on a journey to persuade 
millions of the strength of our vision, the relevance of our 
policies, the urgency of our demand for change."188 Smith's 
concern was still with the vision of Labour, rather than a 
realization that the vision of many in the nation is of 
capitalist wealth creation.
Labour's future and the Dual Advisory Theory.
Labour will continue in its present form and under its 
present direction until the next general election. The fourth 
consecutive Tory victory has provoked talk of a possible 
electoral pact between Labour and the Liberal Democrats to 
defeat the Conservatives. Proposals for such discussions were
188 John Smith reported in The Sunday Times. July 19th
1992, p.2.
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made at the Liberal conference of 1992, but little progress 
was made. Although leading figures in the Liberal Democrats 
may tell Labour leaders they cannot defeat the Tories alone, 
such claims appear to fall on deaf ears. The speed with which 
the party selected its new leader, and its almost unanimous 
approval of him, have guaranteed that Labour will fight on 
against the Tories alone. Their belief is that a Labour 
majority can still be returned.
Internal relations in the Labour Party are likely to be 
largely passive in the following years. Disputes will occur, 
for example over the direction of Labour's European policy, 
but these will not be to an extent to divide the party 
severely. Labour will fight an almost continual election 
campaign in the years ahead, united behind its leadership. 
This unity will be in support of Labour's last throw of the 
dice in its present form. The party cannot survive a fifth 
consecutive defeat.
Success in 1996 or 1997 would mean the continuation of 
the two-party system in British politics for the foreseeable 
future. Defeat would force Labour to face up to the real 
reasons for its defeats. Despite the failings of the current 
Conservative government, this must be treated as a distinct 
possibility.
Without renouncing past Labour governments, the new party 
can never be free of Conservative taunts, and the consequent 
fears which accompany the possibility of a Labour government.
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To throw off these historic shackles Labour must fully embrace 
capitalism and the private sector. Radical growth proposals 
must be produced. The capitalist Conservatives must be out 
capitalized. Under Labour's present leadership this seems 
highly unlikely, because a safe approach is sought. As a 
result the south of England will remain a Tory bedrock, 
enhanced by the Boundary Commission. With this as a base, the 
Tories will easily collect the additional seats they require 
to secure an overall Commons majority. 1992 offered Labour 
its best hope for a return to power. The Conservatives could 
not be so incompetent as to offer Labour such an opportunity 
again.
Without major changes Labour is staring a fifth 
consecutive defeat in the face. The impact of such a defeat 
on the party would be a reawakening of internal conflict. The 
left would pull for a return to a socialist approach, while 
the new right would call for a repositioning of the party, 
possibly even right of center. The likely consequence of a 
further series of internal disputes would be the fatal 
division of the party. An electoral pact with the Liberals 
could well be formed, ultimately forcing a change in the 
British electoral system and the introduction of proportional 
representation. Such a change would guarantee that Labour 
divided into at least two parties.
The period since 1974 has seen Labour carry out much 
movement along the political spectrum. In the period from
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1979 to 1983 the party's policy changes encompassed a rapid 
move to the left. Downs' belief that parties sought the 
political equilibrium at all times was shown not to be the 
case. Internal factions determined the direction the party 
would take in external relations.
The Kinnock period could easily be seen as a 
demonstration of Downsian behavior. This was not the case. 
The direction of the party was determined by, first, the 
failure of the hard left, and second, the consequent rise in 
right-wing thought within the party. The center/right 
coalition took control, witnessed by the defeat of Militant 
and the Kinnock leadership's control of the party structure. 
The reform of policy was similarly influenced by the new 
factional control of the party, but equally significant was 
the fact that Labour was responding to the Thatcher agenda. 
Labour's new policy direction came from reaction rather than 
proaction.
The Labour Party is in a position where it can stagger on 
to the next general election, and once again be the main 
opposition to the Conservatives. If the party is to return to 
power, though, the leadership must be ready to act. By the 
end of 1992, John Smith and his team had made a far from 
auspicious start. Despite the turmoil within the Major 
government, criticisms from within the Labour Party were 
already being heard. During the first six months of his 
leadership Smith had done little to inspire confidence. As
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one Labour MP explained, "He gives the impression that all we 
need to do is sit back and let the Tories lose the next 
election. The lesson of 1992 is that the Tories will bounce 
back."189 In truth Smith needs to start acting now to define 
Labour's own policy agenda. He is acting under the misguided 
belief that "the main reason Labour lost the April general 
election was that Kinnock, and not Smith himself, was party 
leader."190 He has slowed the pace of reform, rather than 
accelerating it. The government may be on the defensive over 
economic policy but Labour still lacks a real alternative.
Once again Labour finds itself leading in opinion polls, 
but voters may still not be willing to support Labour when it 
counts— at the ballot box.191 The visionary policy changes 
needed to lead Labour to victory are still not in sight. 
Labour will continue to lead opinion polls, but without its 
own radical policy agenda these will offer only false hope. 
Labour must take a fresh initiative in setting the policy 
agenda, no longer simply shadowing the Conservatives. It 
needs to present reforming initiatives, such as an industrial 
policy targeting government and industry cooperation or 
constitutional reform, for example of the House of Lords. 
Labour needs to capture the imagination of the electorate.
189 Labour MP, reported by Andrew Grice in The Sunday 
Times. November 22nd 1992, p.11.
190 Andrew Grice, The Sunday Times. November 22nd, 1992.
191 See The Independent. December 13th, 1992, p.19.
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True socialists will not like the party becoming a moderate 
version of the Conservatives, but to return to power this is 
required.
The next general election in Britain, in all likelihood, 
is still three or four years away. Labour and John Smith are 
involved in a long-term game. However, as Neil Kinnock will 
confirm, reforming the Labour Party can only be a slow 
process. If he truly intends to win, John Smith must begin
playing now. Belief in cosmetic changes will leave Smith and 
Labour courting disaster. Explaining away defeat without more 
substantial changes, will leave the party facing the gravest 
crisis of its history. While Neil Kinnock may have reformed 
the party and prepared the way for another, in the way 
Gorbachev did, John Smith can only be the party's savior by 
returning it to power. As with Boris Yeltsin, the jury on 
this savior is still out.
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